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137 
Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”:  
A Law and Economics Perspective 
 





Pervasive graft, widely observed throughout Chinese history but 
deprived of proper outlets and suppressed in the years following the 
Communist Revolution, resurfaced on massive scale when partial 
marketization of the economy was embraced in 1978 and beyond. The 
authorities had endeavored to alleviate the problem, but in an uneven and 
less than determined fashion. The battle against corruption has greatly 
intensified after Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012. The multiyear 
antigraft campaign that has unfolded has been carried out in an ironfisted and 
relentless fashion. It has yielded some tangible benefits, yet the negative side 
of the ledger is heavily loaded. Absent broad-based institutional 
reengineering, the ambitious and costly program’s long-term future may not 
be assured. 
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With few, often ideologically driven exceptions,1 post-1949 
revolutionary-era China has been critically portrayed, and harshly so, by 
academic researchers and policy analysts.2 The new regime’s institutional 
foundations and politico-economic strategies have been subjected to 
relentlessly unfavorable scrutiny.3 The brutalities and human costs of the 
1958-62 Great Leap Forward and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution have been 
highlighted in particularly strident terms.4 The mixture of organizational 
fragility and personal excesses, perhaps even turpitude, accounting for such 
transgressions have been copiously documented and unreservedly pilloried.5 
This firmly entrenched and normatively well-underpinned trend came 
to an abrupt end in 1978, two years following the death in 1976 of Mao 
Zedong, who had cast a long shadow over the Chinese scene since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). His reformist successors, 
spearheaded by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, have embraced the “Open 
Door Policy” and have proceeded to implement a series of measures 
designed to integrate the Chinese economy with that of the rest of the 
(essentially capitalist) world.6 Partial economic liberalization has coincided 
with a degree of political relaxation, or a shift from “hard authoritarianism” 
to a more palatable version depicted as either “pragmatic” or “soft.”7 
The opening up of the economy, coupled with corresponding domestic 
restructuring in a less oppressive and more stable and transparent policy 
setting, has yielded substantial dividends in the form of rapid economic 
growth over a long period of time, perhaps remarkable for such a populous 
country.8 This, in turn, has given rise to a voluminous literature on China’s 
spectacular rise, the Chinese miracle, and the unmistakable emergence of a 
 
 1. See, e.g., WAS MAO REALLY A MONSTER? THE ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO CHANG AND 
HALLIDAY’S MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (Gregory Benton & Lin Chun eds., 2010). 
 2. See, e.g., JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., id. 
 4. See, e.g., id. 
 5. See, e.g., id. 
 6. See generally KEVIN B. BUCKNALL, CHINA AND THE OPEN DOOR POLICY (1990). 
 7. See generally Minxin Pei, China’s Evolution Toward Soft Authoritarianism, in 
WHAT IF CHINA DOES NOT DEMOCRATIZE? IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE 75 (Edward 
Friedman & Barrett L. McCormick eds., 2000); HONGYI LAI, CHINA’S GOVERNANCE MODEL: 
FLEXIBILTY AND DURABILITY OF PRAGMATIC AUTHORITARIANISM (2016). 
 8. See generally LINDA YUEH, CHINA’S GROWTH: THE MAKING OF AN ECONOMIC 
SUPERPOWER (2013). 
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new superpower.9 A recurring theme in this body of work has been that a 
salient feature of this extraordinary structural transformation has been its 
peaceful nature,10 entailing the reconfiguration of China from a revisionist to 
a status quo power.11 The Chinese “harmonious world” blueprint12 and “good 
neighbor” strategy13 have been invoked to pinpoint concrete manifestations 
of this salutary pattern. 
Such construction, while not inaccurate, has notable limitations 
stemming from its oversimplification of complex realities. First, the 
robustness of data relied upon in this context is seldom called into question.14 
Second, China’s meteoric rise may have been due to one-time special 
conditions which may not repeat themselves.15 Third, even if this has not 
been a decisive element of the developmental equation, and the key 
explanation, conventional16 or unconventional,17 lies in the institutional 
domain, it is appropriate to employ counterfactual logic18 and pose the 
 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS 
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1994). 
 10. See, e.g., OVERHOLT, supra note 9; YUEH, supra note 8. 
 11. See generally Lye Liang Fook, China in World Politics: Is China a Status Quo 
Power?, 15 CHINA: AN IINT’L. J. 1, 3 (2017). 
 12. See generally HARMONIOUS WORLD AND CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY (Sujian Guo 
& Jean-Marc F. Blanchard eds., Lexington Books 2010); ROSITA DELIOS & R. JAMES 
FERGUSON, CHINA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL ORDER: FROM PEACEFUL RISE TO HARMONIOUS 
WORLD (2013); ASTRID H. M. NORDIN, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
HARMONIOUS WORLD (2016). 
 13. See generally CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA 
AND THE PACIFIC: INSTITUTIONALIZING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY” (2010); STEVEN 
F. JACKSON, CHINA’S REGIONAL RELATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: FROM 
HARMONIOUS NEIGHBORS TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS (2018). 
 14. See Michael T. Owyang & Hannah G. Shell, China’s Economic Data: An Accurate 
Reflection, or Just Smoke and Mirrors?, 25 REGIONAL ECONOMIST 6, 12 (2017). 
 15. See generally Wing Thye Woo, The Real Reasons for China’s Growth, 41 CHINA J. 
115 (1999); DWIGHT H. PERKINS, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA (World 
Scientific 2015). 
 16. See generally JUSTIN YIFU LIN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION: 
THOUGHT, STRATEGY, AND VIABILITY (2009); JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY (2012); GOVERNING RAPID GROWTH IN CHINA: EQUITY AND INSTITUTIONS (Ravi 
Kanbur & Xiaobo Zhang eds., 2013); YUEN YUEN ANG, HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY 
TRAP (2016); SEBASTIAN HEILMANN, RED SWAN: HOW UNORTHODOX POLICY MAKING 
FACILITATED CHINA’S RISE (2018). 
 17. See generally Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and 
Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011). 
 18. See generally Roda Mushkat, Counterfactual Reasoning: An Effective Component of 
the International Law Methodological Armor?, 18 GERMAN L.J. 59 (2017). 
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question whether under alternative institutional scenarios (e.g., Hong Kong, 
Singaporean, or Taiwanese-style regime) overall performance would have 
not been even better. Fourth, institutions that had served the country 
effectively during industrialization may be ill-suited for a consumption-led, 
knowledge-based, and service-propelled economy.19 
Fifth, as the preceding argument elucidates, the pitfalls of mechanically 
extrapolating from the past should not be overlooked.20 As the example of 
the once dynamic but now static Japanese economic system vividly 
illustrates, historical evolution is not devoid of unexpected twists and turns.21 
It is reasonable to assume that China’s future is shrouded in uncertainty. 
Indeed, there are legitimate concerns about the Chinese juggernaut losing its 
supposed vibrancy and being caught in the notorious “middle-income 
trap.”22 By the same token, China’s rise, if sustained, need not necessarily 
remain peaceful. The truth of the matter is that there are indications that the 
“harmonious society” vision and the “good neighbor” posture may have been 
relegated to the backburner.23 The comforting image of a “status quo power” 
 
 19. See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE POWER (2008); DARON ACEMOGLU 
& JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND 
POVERTY (2012); KUI-WAI LI, ECONOMIC FREEDOM: LESSONS OF HONG KONG (2012); DAVID 
SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THE PARTIAL POWER (2013); MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S CRONY 
CAPITALISM: THE DYNAMICS OF REGIME DECAY (2016); DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE 
(2016); Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, The Once and Future Superpower: Why 
China Won’t Overtake the United States, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May/June 2016), https://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Roger Bootle, China’s Attempt to Overtake US as World’s Biggest 
Economy May Fail, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 4, 2018, 8:50 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
business/2018/03/04/chinas-attempt-overtake-us-worlds-biggest-economy-may-fail/ (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Heritage Foundation, Societies Thrive as Economic Freedom Grows, 
https://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019); ECONOMIST, 
Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
10849115 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).  
 20. See generally Charles F. Duran, Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of 
Forecasting in International Relations and Economics, 1 INT’L STUDIES REV. 11 (1999). 
 21. See generally JAPAN’S LOST DECADE: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, AND PROSPECTS FOR 
RECOVERY (Gary R, Saxonhouse & Robert M. Stern eds., 2004). 
 22. See generally A NEW ECONOMIC GROWTH ENGINE FOR CHINA: ESCAPING THE 
MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP BY NOT DOING MORE OF THE SAME (Wing Thye Woo et al. eds., 2012); 
ASIA AND THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (Francis E. Hutchison & Sanchita Basu Das eds., 2016); 
CHINA’S INNOVATION CHALLENGE: OVERCOMING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (Arie Y. Lewin, 
Martin Kenney, & Johann P. Murmann eds., 2016); AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP IN 
ASIA: THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURING, TRADE, AND FINANCE (Naoyuki Yoshino et al. eds., 
2018). 
 23. See generally Suisheng Zhao, Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial 
Cycle and the Rise of China 24 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 961 (2015); Chris Buckley, Xi of Two 
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has accordingly given way to the less reassuring picture of an “assertive 
status quo power.”24 
Sixth, the writings on the Chinese miracle obscure the “dark side” of 
the historical record. China’s economic growth has consumed vast resources 
and has involved a massive misallocation of capital.25 The economy has been 
plagued by enormous distortions.26 Regional disparities27 and social 
inequality28 have escalated dramatically.29 Large-scale poverty has 
continued to rear its ugly head.30 The regime has failed to deliver adequate 
education31 and healthcare32 to its people. The regulation of risk has been a 
shambles.33 The one-child policy has sown the seeds of demographic 
stagnation.34 The needs of aging population have not been properly 
 
Minds: To Be Good Neighbor or Assert China’s Power?, NEW YORK TIMES: SINOSPHERE 
(June 12, 2014), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/xi-of-two-minds-be-a-goo 
d-neighbor-or-assert-chinas-power/?mtrref=www.google.com.hk&gwh=42DC74657B69E0 
56A78697E19A6971F4&gwt=pay; Zhu Feng, The Limits of Power: Why China Is a Bad 
Neighbor, FIRSTPOST (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.firstpost.com/world/the-limits-of-power-
why-china-is-a-bad-neighbour-120299.html; Yang Hengjun, Why Are China’s Neighbors So 
Afraid of Her?, DIPLOMAT (May 23, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/why-are-chinas-
neighbors-so-afraid-of-her/.  
 24. See generally Robert Farley, China Might Be Just an Assertive Status Quo Power, 
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 29, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-might-just-be-an-assert 
ive-status-quo-power/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
 25. See generally Damien Cubizol, Transition and Capital Misallocation: The Chinese 
Case, 81 J. OF INT’L MONEY & FIN. 88 (2018). 
 26. See generally CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Yiping Huang & 
Miaojie Yu eds., 2013). 
 27. See generally YANQING JIANG, OPENNESS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND REGIONAL 
DISPARITIES: THE CASE OF CHINA (2013). 
 28. See generally UNDERSTANDING INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN CHINA: METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS (Guanghua Wan ed., 2008). 
 29. See generally id. 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. See generally YONG ZHAO, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON? WHY CHINA 
HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD (2014). 
 32. See generally GUANQI ZHOU, THE REGULATORY REGIME OF FOOD SAFETY IN CHINA: 
GOVERNANCE AND SEGMENTATION (2017). 
 33. See generally ROBERT STOWE ENGLAND, AGING CHINA: THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (2005). 
 34. See generally Robert C. Pozen, Tackling the Chinese Pension System, BROOKINGS, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinese-pension-syst 
em-pozen.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
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addressed.35 Environmental degradation has reached mammoth 
proportions.36 Financial fragility has significantly intensified.37 
Seventh, the entire network of interpersonal exchanges—economic, 
political, and social—has been literally drowning in corruption.38 Because of 
lack of opportunities, it may have lurked below the surface during the 
prereform era, but it has forcefully burst into the open shortly thereafter.39 
Rather paradoxically, unlike in other similar historical cases, rampant 
Chinese corruption has mushroomed, rather than moderated, as prosperity 
has spread and the standard of living has climbed.40 While thus far it has not 
exacted a heavy economic toll and has not materially undermined political 
stability, there is empirical evidence to suggest that it may have the potential 
to inflict such damage.41 
The post-1978 regime has not been oblivious to the breadth, depth, and 
pernicious consequences of the problem.42 Some general initiatives—such 
 
 35. See generally Robert C. Pozen, Tackling the Chinese Pension System, BROOKINGS 
(July 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinese-
pension-system-pozen.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).  
 36. See generally CARL WALTER & FRASE J. T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE 
FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2012); DINNY MCMAHON, 
CHINA’S GREAT WALL OF DEBT: SHADOW BANKING, GHOST CITIES, MASSIVE LOANS, AND THE 
END OF THE CHINESE MIRACLE (2018); Economist, China’s Financial System: The Coming 
Debt Bust, ECONOMIST (May 7, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21698240-
it-question-when-not-if-real-trouble-will-hit-china-coming-debt-bust (last visited Aug. 31, 
2019). 
 37. See generally CARL E. WALTER & FRASE J. T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE 
FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2012); DINNY MCMAHON, 
CHINA’S GREAT WALL OF DEBT: SHADOW BANKING, GHOST CITIES, MASSIVE LOANS, AND THE 
END OF THE CHINESE MIRACLE (2018); Economist, China’s Financial System: The Coming 
Debt Bust, ECONOMIST (May 7, 2016), https:// www.economist.com/news/leaders/21698240-
it-question-when-not-if-real-trouble-will-hit-china-coming-debt-bust (last visited Aug. 31, 
2019). 
 38. See generally PEI, supra note 19; Zengke He, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in 
Reform China, 33 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 243 (2000); Andrew Wedeman, 
The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 CHINA Q. 895 (2004); Yong Guo, Corruption 
in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis, 194 CHINA Q. 349 (2008); Andrew Wedeman, 
Corruption and Collective Protest in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION IN 
CHINA 179 (Ting Gong & Ian Scott eds., 2017). 
 39. See generally PEI, supra note 19; Guo, supra note 38; He, supra note 38; Wedeman, 
Corruption and Collective Protest in China, supra note 38. 
 40. See generally Yukon Huang, The Truth about Chinese Corruption, DIPLOMAT (May 
29, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-truth-about-chinese-corruption/ (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2019). 
 41. See generally id. 
 42. See generally He, supra note 38. 
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as modest loosening of authoritarian controls, possibly qualifying as limited 
democratization,43 and revamping of the bureaucratic apparatus, with a view 
to enhancing its responsiveness44—have reflected mounting concerns about 
the corrosive nature of widespread corruption and attempts to contain it 
indirectly.45 A number of anticorruption campaigns have also been 
periodically conducted, targeting the phenomenon directly46 and seeking to 
reinforce the pressures exerted by the fledgling agencies established to 
confront the issue on an ongoing basis.47 Moral education has been resorted 
to as well, in an effort to formulate and pursue a well-rounded strategy.48  
The effectiveness of this multipronged—but ultimately half-hearted, 
scattered, shallow, and uneven—strategy has proved negligible, however.49 
The current anticorruption campaign—the longest, most ferocious, and 
without parallel in its unremitting flow—has vastly surpassed any top-down 
mobilization endeavors witnessed since the Cultural Revolution.50 For better 
or for worse, it has also produced some tangible results, even if their impact 
beyond the medium-term horizon remains uncertain.51 The aim of this article 
is to assess, from a law and economics perspective, which is particularly 
pertinent for that purpose, the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
anticorruption drive presently waged by the Chinese authorities. 
The survey focuses, in this order, on the characterization of corruption 
in China, its manifestations, its origins, highlights of the economic approach 
to corruption, essential features of the “Xi Jinping era,” fundamental nature 
of the anticorruption campaign, and its systematic evaluation. The campaign 
is the brainchild of President and General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping, and his close associates, and is 
presented as such. It is intimately intertwined with his name, personality, and 
policies. It is the single most important domestic strategic undertaking by Xi 
and his inner circle and easily overshadows all their other major policy 
initiatives. Indeed, the current anticorruption drive could be said to define 
 
 43. See id. at 265. 
 44. See id. at 265-266. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 267-268. 
 47. See id. at 266-267. 
 48. See id. at 268-269. 
 49. See generally id. 
 50. See generally Guilhem Fabre, Xi Jinping’s Challenge: What Is Behind China’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign?, 5 J. OF SELF-GOVERNANCE & MANAGEMENT ECON. 7 (2017). 
 51. See generally id. 
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the regime. This accounts for the linkage between the campaign and the Xi 
Jinping era. 
 
II.  Chinese Conceptions of Corruption 
 
In grappling with intricate behavioral patterns, academic researchers 
typically strive to strike a balance between satisfactorily capturing diversity 
and realizing a meaningful degree of uniformity.52 This posture is reflected 
in the exploration of corruption in China. The examination of the subject 
commonly begins by laying a definitional foundation that is consistent with 
international practices, rather than geared to local conditions.53 Modest 
adjustments may be contemplated, but they normally do not amount to 
substantial departures from widely accepted standards.54 This is generally 
followed by an attempt to accommodate country-specific nuances.55 
Context-free attributions of meaning range from compact to elaborate. 
At the most basic level, corruption is equated in the Chinese setting with the 
“misuse of public authority for private gain.”56 This conceptualization is 
predicated on a clear distinction between the public and private domains, 
which may be blurred in China,57 but it has nevertheless proved workable in 
theoretically-inspired and empirical inquiries.58 It should be noted, however, 
that it does not encompass categories of corruption that surface outside the 
public realm and that it may thus be necessary to incorporate into the 
definition forms of private corruption such as those observed in the corporate 
sector and relating to issues of fiduciary responsibility.59 
 
 52. See, e.g., Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial Extraterritoriality: 
Hunt v. T&N plc, 40 MCGILL L.J. 759 (1995). 
 53. See, e.g., He, supra note 38. See also Kilkon Ko & Cuifen Weng, Critical Review of 
Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: A Formal-Legal Perspective, 20 J. OF 
CONTEMP. CHINA 359 (2011); Xizi Lu, A Literature Review on the Definition of Corruption 
and Factors Affecting the Risk of Corruption, 4 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 171 (2016). 
 54. See, e.g., He, supra note 38. 
 55. See, e.g., Yan Sun, The Politics of Conceptualizing Corruption in Reform China, in 
4 CRITICAL READINGS ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 1215 (Kjeld E. Brodsgaard ed., 
2017).  
 56. Andrew Wedeman, The Challenge of Commercial Bribery and Organized Crime in 
China, 22 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 18 (2013). 
 57. See JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA (1997). 
 58. See, e.g., ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND RISING 
CORRUPTION IN CHINA (2012). 
 59. See generally Wedeman, supra note 56. 
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The interplay between the public and private ingredients is at the core 
of efforts to distil the essence of Chinese-style “crony capitalism” and the 
corrupt practices it begets.60 This is assumed to be an institutional setting “in 
which capitalists gain valuable rents from politicians”61 or, to express it in a 
more nuanced fashion, “an instrumental union between capitalists and 
politicians designed to acquire wealth, legally or otherwise, and the latter to 
seek and retain power.”62 Putin’s Russia is also said to serve as a fertile 
ground for the spread of crony capitalism and the corrupt excesses it 
abundantly breeds.63 
In daily discourse, the emphasis is loosely placed on the public aspects 
or the generic phenomenon.64 Yichuan mou shi and jia gong ji si therefore 
denote, respectively, “using one’s power or authority for private ends” and 
“us[ing] public resources to manufacture privates ones.”65 Alternatively, any 
symptoms of corruption may be identified with tanwu (greed and dirt), fuhua 
(being rotten and decomposed), fubai (rottenness associated with poor 
performance), and bu zheng zhi feng (engaging in wrong and devious 
behavior).66 The propensity to freely cross the boundary between the public 
and private spheres may be ascribed to the fact that, in the Chinese milieu, 
the former often encroaches on the latter.67 
The public side of the images floated has had three notable 
characteristics.68 First, stress has traditionally been laid on the use of power 
or authority for private ends and the use of public resources to manufacture 
private ones rather than the abuse or misuse inevitably manifesting itself in 
the course of such pursuits.69 This broad-based portrayal has both advantages 
and disadvantages.70 On the one hand, it allows the widening of the net when 
targeting corrupt practices and thus can be said to introduce an inherently 
strict test for assessing potential transgressions.71 On the other hand, the 
 
 60. See generally PEI, supra note 19. 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally KAREN DAWISHA, PUTIN’S KLEPTOCRACY: WHO OWNS RUSSIA? (2014). 
 64. See KWONG, supra, note 57, at 3-5. 
 65. See id. at 3. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 3-5. 
 68. See He, supra, note 38, at 244. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
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ambiguity pervading the depictions paves the way for possible manipulation 
by officials in a position to exploit the terminological elasticity.72 
Second, similar fuzziness has marked the notion of “private interest.”73 
Again, this may be attributed to China’s collectivist or socialist legacy, 
which has led to a convergence of and overlapping between the public and 
private domains, with the former typically emitting stronger impulses and 
exerting greater influence over policy outcomes.74 Private in this 
unconventional, if viewed from a narrow Western or liberal perspective,75 
institutional context extends well beyond the sector of social life generally 
unimpeded by interventions from governmental and other public 
organizations in that it includes various collective entities as well, both small 
(e.g., work unit) and large (e.g., entire province).76 
Third, the inclination to paint the picture with a broad brush has been 
noted with regard to the delineation of the specific source or subject of 
corruption.77 A wide range of scenarios may be conjured up.78 In the public 
realm, an official, whether serving or retired, may be zeroed in on but so may 
be her/his relatives, or even a whole public body and its leaders, to cite just 
the most obvious examples.79 Once more, this may be looked at from a 
favorable or unfavorable angle.80 Those charged with combating corruption 
enjoy considerable leeway in executing their task, but they may readily abuse 
their authority.81 
Ideational opaqueness is amply observed at grassroots level, a pattern 
evocatively mirrored in the popular literature.82 In daily parlance, corruption, 
as grasped by Chinese people, is thus equated “not just [with] particular 
codifiable transgressions, but also to broad, even metaphoric perceived 
deficiencies of character, society, and history.”83 This stands in marked 
contrast to “social science approaches [which] generally detail behaviors 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See KWONG, supra note 57, at 3-5. 
 75. See generally RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS (2003). 
 76. See He, supra, note 38, at 244. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See generally JEFFREY C. KINKLEY, CORRUTION AND SOCIALISM IN LATE SOCIALIST 
CHINA: THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL NOVEL (2007). 
 83. Id. at 171. 
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considered corrupt, the norms (laws, rules, or simply expectations) these 
behaviors defy, and how and why this defiance persists.”84 The prevailing 
tendency is to address corruption in nonutilitarian terms, as “an evil in 
itself”:85 “Unfairness, injustice, and the slowing of economic growth may be 
immanent with corruption, but corruption is not to be condemned simply 
because of its consequences.”86 
Interestingly, while corrupt practices are regarded at this level as an 
elastic and evolving phenomenon, rather than a readily codifiable set of 
transgressions,87 and one possessing a dynamic quality which renders it 
mutable,88 cognitive reorientations across space and over time are not 
random but engendered by sociopolitical transformations.89 A notable aspect 
of the process is the heightened sensitivity to the concentration of power.90 
Consequently, although “[o]utright calls for democracy are few and far 
between, … ‘excessive’ power is coming to be seen as ‘corruption.’”91 The 
inference tentatively drawn is that this “may someday threaten the 
Communist Party.”92 
At the elite level, deemed paramount for fruitful investigation of 
Chinese corruption, the focus is on inappropriate dealings between resource 
holders in the public and private sectors, which underlie a system of crony 
capitalism.93 A salient feature of corruption in China thus is a deeply 
ingrained “collusion among elites.”94 The emphasis placed on this 
characterization stems from the fact that “such collusion, both legal and 
illicit, lies at the heart of crony capitalism in all societies regardless of the 
nature of their political regimes.”95 Such attribution of relative importance 
does not necessarily imply that “petty corruption,” consisting “primarily of 
the small bribes and informal fees incurred by individual citizens as they go 
 
 84. Id. at 170. 
 85. Id. at 171. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 3.  
 88. See id. at 3, 171-172. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id at 3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally PEI, supra note 19. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Id. 
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about their normal activities,”96 is a marginal phenomenon lacking serious 
ramifications.97 
The distinction between collusive corruption and its petty counterpart 
is not trivial, however. The former is “more destructive than [the latter] 
because such behavior destroys the organizational and normative fabric of 
the [S]tate, increases the difficulty of detection, and produces greater 
financial gains for perpetrators.”98 Additionally, “[d]ue to the greater 
predatory capabilities possessed by elites engaged in collusive corruption, 
local governments penetrated by these elites unavoidably experience 
degradation in their capacity for providing public goods.”99 Indeed, the 
impact of cross-sector elite collusion may be so profoundly corrosive that 
“corruption networks, consisting of officials, businessmen, and gangsters, 
[may] seize control of these jurisdictions and turn them into local mafia 
[S]tates.”100 
Another pernicious by-product of collusive corruption is believed to be 
friction between State and society.101 Where collusive elites are perceived to 
blatantly, persistently, and widely abuse their power, grassroots resentment 
may build up and boil over.102 The absence of institutional channels to 
facilitate an orderly and productive expression of such sentiment may 
exacerbate the sense of alienation and frustration, culminating in acts of 
violence and unruly protest.103 China’s State machinery has proved capable 
of containing bottom-up threats to its rule, but they potentially sow the seeds 
of social instability and undermine effective governance.104 
Collusive corruption is not an exclusive Chinese behavioral pattern. In 
Asia, it has commonly taken the form of “developmental corruption.”105 The 
latter, in turn, has constituted an integral part of an institutional constellation 
referred to as the “developmental State,” which has played a pivotal role in 
the industrialization of the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese economies.106 
 
 96. JONATHAN R. STROMSETH ET AL., CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PUZZLE: ENABLING 
TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN A SINGLE-PARTY STATE 64 (2017). 
 97. See id. 
 98. PEI, supra note 19, at 9. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Wedemen, supra note 58, at 15-51. 
 106. See id. 
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These three remarkable transformational experiences have “rested on a 
foundation of old-fashioned machine politics.”107 Collusion between 
resource holders in the public and private sectors at similar historical 
junctures has of course been a nearly universal phenomenon,108 but in Asia 
it has exhibited its own distinct attributes: 
 
Business provided the political resources (mostly money) 
that allowed conservative, pro-business political leaders to build 
stable political coalitions by binding together what would 
otherwise have been a series of rival and often hostile factions, 
each more interested in power than policy per se. Using funds 
obtained from the business sector, the “big bosses” provided 
factional leaders with a monetary buy-in. The factional bosses, in 
turn, doled out funds to rank-and-file politicians who used the 
money to fund local “constituent organizations,” pay community 
organizers to mobilize voters, and ultimately, if necessary, to buy 
the votes needed to win elections and thereby ensure conservative 
control of government. Control of government enabled the ruling 
coalition to harness [S]tate policies to the goal of consolidating its 
grip on power and repaying its business supporters with a 
combination of “public goods” in the form of broadly pro-
business macroeconomic policies; ‘private goods’ in the form of 
government subsidies, tax breaks, government contracts, and 
rents; and pork-barrel spending aimed toward its supporters at 
large. The new result was a pro-business system of redistributive 
politics that drew its sustenance from both business profits and 
government revenues.109 
 
The Chinese configuration of collusive corruption poses an analytical 
challenge in that it does not neatly fit into this institutional model,110 which 
has transactive (consisting of inter-sectoral exchanges) and redistributive 
(entailing the deployment and allocation of resources for political purposes) 
elements inherently attractive to the two sides to the deal: Politicians benefit 
by holding onto power and business groups enjoy a healthy stream of 
 
 107. Id. at 17. 
 108. See, e.g., TERRY GOLWAY, MACHINE MADE: TAMMANY HALL AND THE CREATION OF 
MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS (2014). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 52-79. 
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profits.111 This Faustian bargain with the devil of corruption takes its toll on 
third parties, notably the consuming public, and may reasonably be regarded 
as a type of organized crime “wherein the political mafioso extort a 
percentage of the profits of legitimate—and illegitimate—businesses in 
exchange for enacting pro-business policy … regimes.”112 Yet, it lends 
stability to the system and stimulates economic growth.113 China, on the 
other hand, appears to have been plagued by a “degenerative” variant of 
corruption, which: 
more closely resembles a mugging or a liquor store stickup 
because it involves much higher levels of what has been termed, 
awkwardly perhaps, “auto-corruption” and one  way flow of 
“plunder.” Developmental corruption is thus parasitical in that the 
political machine sucks its sustenance from an economy but does 
not necessarily intend to kill its economic host. Degenerative 
corruption, by contrast, is predatory in that it feeds directly on an 
economy and its vitals. Both may do considerable harm, but 
degenerative corruption is much more likely to prove fatal and 
manifest its worse effects more quickly.114 
 
Elite-level collusion, even if exhibiting manifestations of symptomatic 
degeneration, is not necessarily associated with cognitive coherence, let 
alone cohesive and friction-free action.115 An interesting distinction in the 
Chinese context is that between the attitudes toward corruption of liberals 
and conservatives.116 The former are inclined to adopt a narrower 
perspective, somewhat closer to the definitions found in Western academic 
literature, but the latter tend to range more widely in their search for meaning 
and equate corrupt practices with those that violate the moral conventions of 
the community-at-large.117 The abuse of public office is thus not confined to 
 
 111. See id. at 52-53. 
 112. Id. at 53. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE POLITICS (2006); Jiangnan 
Zhu & Dong Zhan, Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized 
Anticorruption in China, 50 COMP. POL. STUD. 1186 (2017). 
 116. See generally Yun Sun, The Politics of Conceptualizing Corruption in Reform China, 
35 CRIM. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (2001). 
 117. See id. at 248.  
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public office holders’ pursuit of private gain and entails undermining the 
general interests of society (zhengge shehui liyi).118 
It should be noted that such perceptual divergences are not ineluctably 
reflected in prevailing sociopolitical realities.119 Indeed, there is empirical 
evidence to suggest that China’s more liberal regions have embraced a more 
progressive stance toward corruption than conservative ones and have 
enjoyed greater success in tackling the problem.120 An interesting contrast in 
this respect is that between the “Guangdong” and “Chongqing models.”121 
The market-oriented and outward-looking southern province of Guangdong 
has fared far better in grappling with corruption than the collectivistically 
inspired and inward-looking megacity of Chongqing and the adjacent 
Sichuan province.122 
Reform-era Chinese grasp of corrupt practices thus displays partial 
convergence with Western academic conceptions at the fundamental 
academic level, sufficiently so for undertaking systematic comparisons and 
endeavoring to construct a unified theoretical framework.123  This crossing 
of analytical pathways, however, promptly gives way to pronounced 
divergences for cultural and structural reasons. Ambiguity, blurring of the 
boundary between the public and private spheres, elasticity, fluidity, and 
incongruities between the cognitive and behavioral components of the 
attitudinal fabric pervade daily and policy discourse. Degenerative features 
of corruption are witnessed on a scale seldom observed elsewhere, partly 
accounting for the overarching priority accorded to the campaign presently 
waged to alleviate them. 
 
III. Variety of Chinese Corrupt Practices 
 
A complex phenomenon observed in a diverse sociopolitical setting, 
such as corruption in a country of China’s size and multifaceted character, 
inevitably encompasses a broad range of activities, in this case nefarious in 
nature. As indicated previously, juxtaposition of elite-level corrupt practices 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. See generally STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 96; Bin Gong & Benno Torgler, Causes 
of Corruption: Evidences from China (Center for Research in Economics, Management and 
the Arts, Working Paper No. 2010-07), http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2010-07.pdf. 
 120. See Gong & Torgler, supra note 119. 
 121. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 96, at 97. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See generally Gong & Scott eds., supra note 38; Leslie Holmes, Combating 
Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other Agencies in Comparative Perspective, 
3 ECON. & POL. STUD. 42 (2015). 
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with those seen at grassroots level paves the way for a fruitful distinction 
between collusive corruption and its petty counterpart. Besides enhancing 
conceptual clarity, such a dichotomy possesses considerable practical value 
because it may serve as a basis for allocating scarce resources to a behavioral 
pattern that has more pernicious consequences. Different strategies may also 
be resorted to in confronting the two problems. 
A simple typology cannot capture, however, the intricacies of Chinese 
corrupt activities. For this reason, other classificatory schemes, often more 
nuanced, have been proposed.124 Some authors confine themselves to merely 
specifying the forms of corruption witnessed in China. The following 
detailed list belongs to this category: taking bribes or embezzling State funds 
and properties; obtaining benefits for dependents, relatives, and friends in 
processes related to recruitment, school admission, job assignment, 
determining cadre status, securing an exit permit, and admission to the CCP; 
neglecting one’s duties and thereby causing economic damage; facilitating 
access to key official positions for trusted followers; underperforming at 
work, dodging responsibility, and blaming others; behaving arbitrarily, 
retaliating, and fabricating evidence against others; producing false reports, 
being boastful, and tending to exaggerate; using public funds for gift-giving 
and paying for banquets; operating businesses and profiteering; taking 
advantage of one’s authority to build or occupy property; living 
extravagantly; entering into inappropriate sexual relationships; forming 
cliques to further one’s interests; gambling and paying for sex; spending 
lavishly on marriage and funeral ceremonies; giving expression to 
superstitious beliefs; participating in smuggling; and selling State secrets.125  
Such mechanically compiled listings have been superseded by 
analytically underpinned classificatory schemes, either comprehensive or 
selective in scope.126 Among the former, Sun’s phenomenology of reform-
era corruption stands out.127 It includes ten types of cadre corruption—
embezzlement (tanwu), bribe taking (shouhui), misappropriation (nuoyong), 
squandering (huihuo langfei), privilege seeking (yiquan mousi), illegal 
earnings (feifa shouru), negligence (duzhi), illegal profiteering (touji daoba), 
violation of accounting procedures (weifan caijing jilu), and moral 
 
 124. See in particular TING GONG, THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OUTCOMES 7-11 (1994); MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY 
DESIGN 96-110 (2004); YAN SUN, CORRUPTION AND MARKET IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 26-
42, 53-191 (2004). 
 125. See GONG, supra note 124, at 9.  
 126. See MANION, supra note 124; SUN, supra note 124. 
 127. See SUN, supra note 124, at 26-42.  
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decadence (daode duoluo)—and four other types of misconduct—violation 
of family planning policies, violation of diplomatic codes, disclosure of 
classified information, and deserting overseas posts.128 
Some of these categories are subdivided further: negligence into theft 
through contract, theft through payment fraud, theft through receipt fraud, 
theft through managerial fraud, and theft through property transfer; bribe 
taking into commission payments, salaries and bonuses, loans, purchase, 
reimbursements, product trials; and special occasion gifts; misappropriation 
into loans for commercial use, either legal (business, stocks, and other uses) 
or illegal (smuggling, drug trafficking, substandard manufacturing, 
unlicensed business, and the like), and diversion of designated funds; 
squandering into feasting, gift giving, sightseeing, and luxury amenities; 
privilege seeking into allocating regulated goods to relatives and friends and 
paying private tuition; negligence into that observed in business ventures and 
deals and that seen in supervision and regulation; illegal profiteering into that 
involving State-regulated goods, State-regulated permits, and illegal 
products and schemes; violation of accounting procedures into retention of 
revenues due to the State; cheating the State out of financial allocation, 
subsidies, and other allowances; illicit use and extraction of public funds; 
changing the nature of State assets, price hiking, and illegitimate increase of 
wages, bonuses, and subsidies; and moral decadence into patronizing 
prostitutes and sheltering mistresses.129 
While this careful and detailed account is not devoid of ambiguities, 
reflecting the elasticity and fluidity of daily and policy discourse, it is marked 
by a reasonable degree of notional precision and structural coherence. These 
qualities are enhanced by constructing a four-dimensional typology and 
locating the corrupt practices identified within that framework.130 The 
dimensions consist of the nature of the actor (organizational versus 
individual) and three categories of activities: essential/non-public, 
nonessential/public, and mixed/mixed.131 For instance, bribery offenses may 
be committed by either an organization or an individual and are classified as 
essential/nonpublic; accounting violations originate in the organizational 
realm and are deemed nonessential/public; embezzlement falls into the 
individual and nonessential/public space; illegal income may be earned by 
either an organization or an individual and is considered mixed/mixed; and 
 
 128. See id. at 27. 
 129. See id. at 27-33. 
 130. See id. at 36. 
 131. See id. 
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moral decadence is a product of individual behavior possessing mixed/mixed 
attributes.132 
Sun has also followed the selective route by focusing on corrupt 
practices as either two-way exchanges or transactions between concrete 
individuals or institutions and nonexchanges or nontransactions where the 
interactive element is absent.133 A quintessentially transactional-style 
corruption thus involves individuals such as officials and citizens.134 In the 
institutional sphere, the players participating in the quasi-exchanges or 
quasi-transactions are the State and localities and the State and officials.135 
A fundamentally nonexchange or nontransactional type of corrupt practices 
is that featuring officials and the public coffer.136 This is a narrow-based 
classificatory scheme, but it can comfortably accommodate the several 
micro-level behavioral patterns pinpointed above.137 
Another context-sensitive selective taxonomy of corruption has been 
proposed by Mannon.138 She has opted to single out bureaucratic commerce, 
which “refers to the business activities of companies created by the party and 
government departments, including law enforcement agencies, in the 1980s 
and early 1990s for the purpose of generating profits”;139 predatory 
exactions, which “refers to excessive compulsory and irregular tax charges 
exacted mainly from peasants by county and township governments, local 
government agencies, and village authorities in the wake of 
decollectivization in the 1980s”;140 corrupt exchanges, equated with and 
“often prosecuted as bribery or illegal commissions”;141 public funds as 
private capital, a form of financial corruption, entailing “the 
misappropriation of public funds as interest-free capital for private 
investment”;142 and illegal privatization of State-enterprise assets.143  
Besides such attempts to impose a modicum of structure on the plethora 
of Chinese corrupt practices sprouting in the public domain, there have been 
 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 158-159. 
 134. See id. at 68. 
 135. See id. at 120. 
 136. See id. at 87. 
 137. See id. at 53-191. 
 138. See MANION, supra note 124. 
 139. Id. at 97. 
 140. Id. at 101. 
 141. Id. at 103. 
 142. Id. at 106. 
 143. See id. at 107-110. 
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efforts to identify and capture the essence of private sector corruption.144 The 
studies exploring this side of the picture have shed meaningful light on 
system-wide constellations and dynamics, as well as specific corrupt 
activities and their ramifications. The volume and diversity have not been 
sufficiently large, however, to enable proper aggregation and differentiation. 
Valuable insights have been produced at the macro and micro levels, but 
without laying a foundation for constructing a composite portrait. 
As outlined above, the public sector has been subjected to a more 
elaborate and richer examination in the process of seeking classificatory 
order. The definitional ambiguity pinpointed in the previous section has been 
reduced rather than eliminated. By the same token, the categories indicated 
at times overlap and are not readily amenable to operationalization. 
Nevertheless, a nuanced understanding emerges of an intricate phenomenon 
in a country where the public sector continues to overshadow its private 
 
 144. See, e.g., Linfen J. Hwang & Robin S. Snell, Turnaround, Corruption, and 
Mediocrity: Leadership and Governance in Three State-Owned Enterprises in Mainland 
China, 43 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 111 (2003); Yuanyuan Wang & Jing Yu, Corruption and Firm 
Growth: Evidence from China, 23 CHINA ECON. REV. 415 (2012); Li Dang & Ruilong Yang, 
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China, 4 ECON. & POL. STUD. 39 (2016); CHEN LIN ET AL., ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS 
AND SHAREHOLDER VALUATIONS: EVENT STUDY EVIDENCE FROM CHINA (2016); Melanie 
Manion, Taking China’s Anticorruption Campaign Seriously, 4 J. OF ECON. & POL. STUD. 3 
(2016); Huihua Nie, Chen Li, & Chaofan Ma, Why Chinese Anti-Corruption Has Not Yet 
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GOVERNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2017); Haoyuan Ding ET AL., Equilibrium 
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(July 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn. 
edu/dist/3/517/files/2018/11/Draft_July_25_2017-1jfifzg.pdf; Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 
The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China, (FEEM, Working Paper No. 
73.2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628567; Mariassunta Gianntti & 
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Firms in China, GLOBAL BUSINESS OUTLOOK, http://www.globalbusinessoutlook.com/the-
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(last visited Feb. 3, 2020); Bo Li, Zhengwei Wang, & Hao Zhou, China’s Corruption 
Campaign and Credit Reallocation to Non-SOEs (Aug. 2017), http://gcfp.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Li-Wang-Zhou.pdf; Jianwei Shi et al., Moving towards a Better 
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sector counterpart in many crucial respects, and increasingly so, despite 
possible expectations to the contrary.145 
 
IV. Roots of Chinese Corruption 
 
The dominant view of the origins of present-day corrupt practices in 
China revolves around the partial post-1978 marketization of the economy, 
an incomplete process characterized by twists and turns, but which has 
progressed sufficiently to substantially reshape the sociopolitical 
landscape.146 A notable by-product of the “halfway house”-style institutional 
configuration that has resulted from the hesitant shift from State to market 
has been a dual structure liberally accommodating elements of both pre- and 
post-reform era organizational legacies and initiatives.147 Within this strewn-
with-contradictions façade, State-controlled and market-driven entities have 
been provided with ample space to comfortably but problematically 
coexist.148 
A conspicuous example had been dual-track pricing, which had long 
featured State-determined and market-shaped prices of commodities, interest 
rates charged on bank loans, import duties, and land lease fees.149 Another 
similar pattern had persistently involved reliance on a dual system of State-
influenced and market-propelled distribution of resources, paving the way 
for “preferential” fiscal, monetary, and regulatory treatment of certain 
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regions, industries, and individual enterprises.150 This bipolar institutional 
constellation is thought to have offered considerable scope for government 
agencies and public officeholders to trade their allocation power over State 
controls for private benefits by taking advantage of the premium paid for 
goods and services, over prices prevailing in the State-managed segment of 
the economy, by players operating in the free marketplace.151 
Other key pockets of activity within this two-dimensional hybrid 
organizational structure replete with opportunities to derive “economic 
rents” have included the administrative examination and approval 
machinery, oversight of public investment funds, and government 
spending.152 The first of these procedural mechanisms pertains to a host of 
overly elaborate approval processes employed by central ministries and/or 
their subnational branches in evaluating project proposals originating in 
various sectors and industries.153 Their complex nature, coupled with poor 
transparency, has turned them into a breeding ground for corruption.154 By 
the same token, public investment and government spending decisions have 
tended to assume the form of administrative fiat, furnishing “rent-seekers” 
with an abundant room “to cut kick-back deals with those competing for 
shares of the ‘pork barrel,’ which are usually lucrative and risk-free.”155 
“Rent-seeking” in the highly sensitive judicial and law enforcement 
realm has had particularly deleterious effects because of the high likelihood 
of it gradually but irrevocably mutating into pernicious and stubborn crime 
and the heavy financial costs foisted on the State.156 Examples commonly 
invoked to illustrate the gravity of corrupt practices in this specific sphere 
highlight the socioeconomic harm wrought by customs officers, policemen, 
and tax collectors who work with criminals in money laundering, drug 
trafficking, smuggling, prostitution, producing and selling forgeries, or 
cooking the books for tax or import duty evasions.157 
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Manifestations of economic dualism, and ensuing corrupt practices, 
have abounded at the subnational level, especially in intricate township 
milieus.158 Townships have been small cities whose vibrancy has enabled 
them to absorb a substantial portion of the surplus labor that has migrated 
from the countryside to urban areas following the dissolution of rural 
communes in the early 1980s.159 Township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
have been the most robust segment of the Chinese economy during much of 
the reform era, a source of positive impulses facilitating economic 
advancement throughout the entire system.160 While formally defined as 
“collectives,” TVEs have been the creation of the township governments, 
who have exercised close control over their financial, human resource, 
marketing, and planning activities.161  
Consequently, strategically positioned public officeholders have 
doubled as dedicated entrepreneurs.162 There has also ineluctably been 
extensive government interference in all business domains, with enterprises 
deprived of property rights necessary to shield them from exogenous 
intrusions.163 The officials-cum-entrepreneurs have unequivocally embraced 
the goals of their commercial counterparts, which could be best pursued by 
relentlessly seeking high-octane economic growth.164 The inevitable upshot 
of this unique variant of “local corporatism” has been the cartelization and 
capture by private interests of public institutions, including those performing 
regulatory functions, driving the economy forward but fueling corruption.165 
The heavy concentration of power in a geographically and functionally 
fragmented authoritarian governance regime has aggravated the problem.166 
On the one hand, the politico-bureaucratic elite has continued to play a 
pivotal role in guiding the transition from State to market, maintaining 
control over the commanding heights of the bipolar economic structure and 
converting its access to vast pool of resources into a vehicle for gaining 
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personal advantage.167 On the other hand, the overall governance architecture 
has become increasingly fractured, allowing subnational units, particularly 
in relatively affluent coastal regions, to operate freely: “With such wide-
ranging responsibilities, little oversight and lack of accountability in an 
authoritarian [S]tate deeply influenced by cultural ideas such as guanxi, 
provincial leaders and those close to them can more easily use their positions 
to develop large corruption networks.”168  
Command over massive resources should not be equated with adequate 
official compensation. Indeed, poor pay, in addition to eroding employee 
morale and motivation, as well as sustaining a steady exodus to the private 
sector, is believed to have contributed to the proliferation of corrupt practices 
in China, in the past and at present.169 Public employees’ salaries have 
gradually been increased, both in nominal and real terms, but not to a point 
of alleviating the problem.170 The material benefits potentially obtained by 
means of untoward activities exceed them by a large margin. The improved 
compensation has thus been derided as “nothing compared to what officials 
can put in their pockets through corruption,”171 falling far short of what might 
be needed “to stop them.”172 
Corrupt activities, of course, do not necessarily go unpunished, 
inflicting a possible cost on those who engage in them and serving as a likely 
deterrent.173 The effectiveness of harsh responses to this type of crime has 
been firmly demonstrated in the Hong Kong and Singapore context.174 By 
the same token, the adverse implications of a lackadaisical policy stance in 
this respect have been vividly witnessed in India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines.175 For the most part, the Chinese experience has been consistent 
with patterns observed in these three industrializing and populous Asian 
countries.176 The probability of detection and punishment has been 
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traditionally low.177 Moreover, those actually exposed have seldom paid a 
hefty price for their transgressions.178 
Institutional accounts, often grounded in economic logic, may convey 
the impression that rampant corruption in China is a contemporary 
phenomenon, neatly traced to the opening up of a previously hermetically 
closed and static economy, which has not undergone wholesale restructuring 
over a lengthy period and which is consequently saddled with imbalances 
rendering it vulnerable to an array of corrupt practices. Alternatively, if a 
longer time horizon is adopted for this purpose, that Chinese corruption is 
the sole product of organizational patterns, and corresponding incentive 
configurations, underlying an evolving governance regime. Cultural heritage 
has been invoked to complement this possibly narrow perspective.179 
The influence of guanxi and the tradition of gift-giving have featured 
prominently in explanatory schemes laying emphasis on this factor, because 
of their indisputable role in conditioning individuals to give and receive 
bribes.180 It has thus been noted that “[a]part from promoting reciprocity in 
social relations, gift-giving also encourages bribery among civil servants, 
who accept gifts provided by businessmen wishing to cut red tape or to 
obtain licenses or permits improperly.”181 Six commonly observed potential 
bases for guanxi have been identified: “locality or dialect; fictive kinship 
(persons with the same surname); kinship; workplace; trade associations or 
social clubs; and friendship.”182 
The prevalence of informal politics, another variable in the corruption 
equation, may also be attributed to cultural legacy.183 Specifically, “[i]n 
China today as in the past, neither a legal system, nor a moral order can fully 
regulate the behavior of officials.”184 The corollary is that “informal politics 
becomes a convenient tool for political elites to secure power and gain 
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protection.”185 It stands in contrast to formal politics, “which adheres to 
bureaucratic procedure and policies based on institutional interests and 
policy preferences, [by virtue of entailing] loyalty towards individuals, while 
fixed procedures and policies are usually absent.”186 The ineluctable 
inference is that “informal politics is naturally conducive to corruption.”187 
The impulses originating in this space are assumed to be transmitted via 
three interrelated channels.188 First, deeply entrenched factionalism “permits 
groups to emerge, bound by shared background, intertwined careers and 
bureaucratic responsibilities, and loyalties to their leaders, [and then] seek 
… benefits for their members.”189 Second, due to the persistence and 
resilience of informal power structures, “corruption networks can be 
extended as the faction itself expands.”190 Third, given the ubiquity of 
informal politics, “family members of government officials often become 
involved in a leader’s political network, leading to the privatization of public 
power.”191 
A number of additional factors are believed to have contributed to the 
pervasiveness of corrupt activities in Chinese society throughout history.192 
The sheer size of the country, climatic variations experienced, harsh terrain, 
inadequate communication and transportation infrastructure, linguistic 
diversity, and interethnic animosity have detracted from the effectiveness 
and anticorruption endeavors, whatever their form.193 Susceptibility to 
natural disasters has compounded the problem by throwing up plentiful 
opportunities for private gain for public officials engaged in implementation 
of humanitarian relief operations during and after the physical disruption.194 
To complicate matters, financially intensive infrastructure enhancements, 
ripe for exploitation, have been handled, subject to few constraints, by 
government officials and related parties.195 
Some of these analytical accounts have been enriched with theoretical 
insights. Notably, the modernization paradigm, also known as “revisionist” 
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and “structural-functionalist,” has been resorted to in order to strip 
corruption of its moral connotations and place it in an appropriate 
developmental context.196 Within this conceptual framework, corrupt 
practices are the inevitable by-product of the modernization process, and 
vanish or, more correctly, diminish when economic development enters a 
mature phase, characterized by a high degree of institutional deepening and 
strong rule of law.197 It is further and controversially asserted that corruption 
may even perform certain positive functions while modernization progresses 
by filling gaps in the fragile politico-bureaucratic façade.198 
Closely aligned with this developmental perspective, but less time 
dependent, is the theoretical notion that corrupt activities are sustained by 
innate bureaucratic pathologies.199 The underlying lofty vision may suggest 
otherwise, but in practice, due to a fundamentally skewed incentive structure, 
public organizations, although not devoid of channels for the expression of 
altruistic motives, serve as convenient platforms for the pursuit of self-
interest.200 It is thus common for civil servants “to create informational 
networks of friends, favor recipients, contracts, and communication links 
based upon primarily personal, rather than official relationships with 
others.”201 The extent to which such behavioral propensities exert palpable 
influence hinges on the nature of institutional setting, which often reflects 
evolutionary dynamics and remaking of the incentive structure.202 
The rational choice model, while rooted in philosophy of economic 
individualism, does not in fact diverge markedly from the above two 
analytical schemes.203 The basic premise here is that corruption is the result 
of deliberate choice—rather than, for example, unavoidable cultural 
proclivity—whereby rational individuals weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of deviating from a prescribed path in an environment akin to 
the marketplace.204 Two variables determine the outcome of the careful 
deliberations: “a monopolistic condition on the side of the bureaucracy, and 
a black market to benefit the profiteering activities of the bureaucracy.”205 
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The two elements are not necessarily in balance and, “[w]hen demand 
outpaces supply, a black market in government services may surface.”206  
In such circumstances, “market”-induced corrupt practices (largely 
inspired by who pays the most) may override those of the “parochial” variety 
(primarily motivated by family ties, group identity, personal feelings, and 
the like) and are best designated as “rent-seeking.”207 Specific Malaysian 
experience is relied upon in support of this proposition.208 It entails the use 
of bureaucratic authority to allocate shares to Malay individuals.209 The 
officials enjoying this power have been receiving a percentage of the 
unearned rent in exchange for allotting the shares and deriving substantial 
benefits in the process, partly passed on to members of their inner circle.210 
The widespread incidence of corruption in China is thus attributed to 
multiple causes, some structurally determined and some time-honored, 
shaped by long waves of history and mostly independent of prevailing 
institutional patterns and incentive constellations. Theoretical insights 
selectively underpin the reasoning employed to enhance the validity of the 
explanatory accounts offered, revealing a certain degree of complementarity, 
rather than fundamentally irreconcilable differences, although this issue is 
not comprehensively explored. The relative weight to be accorded to the 
various causes in well-defined settings and the relationship between them 






V.  Law and Economics Angle 
 
The academic examination of legal phenomena, including those with 
policy ramifications, which is typically the case, has evolved significantly in 
the past seven decades.211 The doctrinal approach, which has traditionally 
been the dominant investigative mode, has by no means been relegated to 
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the analytical periphery.212 Interchangeably referred to as the “black-letter-
law” method, it continues to enjoy intellectual prominence, for the most part 
overshadowing competing or complementary paradigms.213 Constructing 
legal arguments with reference to statute law and judicial precedent remains 
the principal pathway to legal discovery, particularly in the common law 
context.214 
The doctrinal approach derives its vitality from the unquestionably 
strong connection with legal practice or the fact that it posits that scholarship 
in the field emanates from the law itself.215 Researchers who follow this route 
thus aim to elucidate, organize, and refine legal ideas and policies by 
applying that logic to authoritative texts encompassing both primary and 
secondary sources.216 The intimate relationship with the law as it is 
confronted and managed in daily life means that the black-letter-method is 
unlikely to be dethroned in the foreseeable future as the primary pedagogical 
legal tool and perhaps even not as a crucial vehicle for ongoing knowledge 
accumulation.217 
That said, the academic law space has increasingly become inhabited 
by contrasting approaches falling under the rubric of “socio-legal studies.”218 
These methodological schemes have been impelled by a range of influences, 
but a key role has been played by the growing perception that—if narrowly 
conceived and solely relied upon—the doctrinal system may prove an overly 
inflexible and restrictive way of dissecting the law and the operations of the 
institutional machinery sustaining it.219 The broad set of socio-legal 
perspectives shares the common goal of placing the entire law underpinned 
governance regime in a multifaceted economic, political, and social context 
and exploring it within a robust conceptual and empirical framework 
embraced by positivistically inclined behavioral scientists.220 
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Law and economics (LE), or economic analysis of law (EAL), occupies 
a distinct segment of that space.221 It consists of the application of models 
employed by scholars in the field of  economics to issues predominantly 
concerning students of law.222 The origins of LE lie in the Chicago School 
of microeconomics.223 The bias toward microeconomic theory and method 
continues to the present day, but it is less pronounced than in the past.224 
Notably, institutional (including organizational) economists and their 
behavioral counterparts have entered the realm of LE, pursuing divergent 
paths from researchers drawing their inspiration exclusively from 
microeconomics, particularly the neoclassical variant.225 
Corrupt activities have been subjected to a systematic LE-style 
examination since the late 1970s.226 As indicated previously, while this is not 
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the sole analytical perspective that may be fruitfully brought to bear on that 
complex phenomenon, in general and in specific sociopolitical milieus, it 
possesses certain tangible advantages. Above all, whereas other conceptual 
paradigms often focus on uncontrollable factors (e.g., climate, culture, ethnic 
divisions, historical legacy, linguistic nuances, local identity, topography, 
and the like) which policy makers cannot manipulate in the short-term and 
even medium-term, LE is heavily geared toward the controllable side of the 
problem management equation.227 Provided it exhibits awareness of 
contextual intricacies shaping human behavior and does not follow 
mechanically the neoclassical microeconomic route, it may productively 
inform anticorruption strategies. 
While rigid adherence to the rational choice model, firmly grounded in 
neoclassical microeconomics, may unduly narrow the field of intellectual 
vision, its theoretical and practical merits, accounting for its lingering 
analytical appeal and only marginally diminished status as the foundation 
stone of LE, should not be overlooked. It is disapprovingly claimed that, in 
its basic form, the model reduces corrupt practices to the product of 
interaction between atomized individuals who seek to maximize utility when 
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engaged in exchanges under conditions of scarcity.228 Becoming embroiled 
in corruption is thus a conscious process featuring careful weighing of costs 
and benefits, ultimately culminating in corrupt behavior since it is consistent 
with maximization of personal profit.229 This circumscribed approach is said 
to conceptualize parties to an exchange as “atomized or ‘undersocialized’ 
actors who are minimally affected by social relations.”230 To put it 
differently, corruption is akin to a two-player game, where an agent and 
client operate in splendid isolation, with “their identities and past relations 
… typically [deemed] neglected factors because they are thought to be 
unimportant.”231 
This is an outdated and overly simplistic characterization of the rational 
choice model. It is now commonly acknowledged by the scheme’s advocates 
that agents obtain utility from process as well as outcome.232 Moreover, the 
traditional notion of a profit maximizing and self-oriented homo economicus 
is increasingly complemented by constructs such as homo communicans 
(who “engages in a search for the substantive ‘right’ by offering arguments 
in public and by entering into a dialogue with other parties whose preferences 
he/[she] hopes to alter through superior reasoning”),233 homo egualis (who 
“is eager to reduce inequality”),234 homo parochius (who “consistently splits 
the world into insiders and outsiders”),235 and homo reciporocans (who 
“displays a propensity to cooperate and share with others who exhibit such 
tendencies—even at a personal cost—and a willingness to take punitive 
action against those who violate cooperative and complementary social 
norms, even if this has adverse personal consequences”).236 
As important is the relaxation of the assumption that seemingly 
unfettered and omniscient agents possess full knowledge of the problems 
they address and proceed to meticulously dissect them.237 To place the 
restrictive proposition on a wider footing, adaptation-centered theories of 
decision making, rooted in evolutionary biology and evolutionary 
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psychology, disciplines that ascribe human physical and behavioral 
configurations to cumulative responses to challenges facing humankind over 
time, have been embraced.238 Neoclassical rationality has thus been 
compelled to share the limelight with its bounded or ecological 
counterpart.239 The latter is often associated with incrementalism, or path 
dependence, and typically entails marginal rather than substantial departures 
from the prevailing state of affairs, the corollary being that merely a handful 
of options are explored at any juncture and selectively to boot.240 
Behaviorally inclined LE scholars who focus on corruption are 
particularly intrigued by the prevalence of manifestations of homo 
reciprocans spirit and their policy ramifications.241 These patterns are, inter 
alia, amply observed and strongly supported by scientific evidence 
generated in sociopsychological experimental milieus, where it has been 
shown that reciprocity plays a pivotal role in public goods and ultimatum 
games.242 The inference drawn is that trust may be a potent force in enduring 
social relationships, although not invariably and at times in the negative 
sense of the term.243 For instance, on the positive side, social researchers 
have demonstrated that trust may encourage cooperation in games in which 
the Nash equilibrium is defection.244 In such situations, it is apparently 
customary for participants to forgo the gains of (sudden) defection if there is 
sufficient trust in the other actors’ willingness to cooperate.245 
Interestingly, behaviorally oriented LE scholars have chosen to 
highlight the negative aspects.246 Their empirically underpinned contention 
is that the smooth execution of corrupt transactions hinges on maintenance 
of a high degree of trust.247 The reason lies in the fact that corruption is an 
intricate and potentially risky undertaking, which may easily unravel due to 
betrayal and treachery.248 Those who become embroiled “in this business 
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delve into a criminal sphere in which networks are as important as mutual 
trust.”249 Paradoxically, the implication presumably is that “[l]ack of trust, 
luckily, can deter corruption.”250 
This leads to the suggestion that the frequency of bribes and similar 
transgressions “can be reduced by rendering reciprocity uncertain, by 
undermining the stability of corrupt transactions.”251 The objective is to 
induce those involved in corruption “to cheat each other.”252 Two possible 
strategies illustrate the underlying logic.253 One approach “would be to grant 
leniency to any perpetrator, the briber or the bribe-taker, who can prove to 
have cheated their counterpart.”254 Another option “would be to penalize 
bribe-giving but not bribe taking [—the favorable consequence being] that 
bribe-takers are free to cheat bribers, without fears of reprisals.”255 
Such behaviorally derived insights have not relegated homo 
economicus to the analytical periphery.256 The pursuit of material advantage 
and self-interest remain a key element of the decision making equation, 
softened at the edges by situational constraints and the type of preferences 
exhibited by homo communicans, homo egualis, homo parochius, and homo 
reciprocans, as well as agents’ capacity to reveal their other-regarding side 
or propensity toward social rationality (“if a socially rational agent can 
perform an action whose joint benefit—i.e., the benefits to the whole 
group—is greater than its joint loss, [he or she] may select that action”).257 
A somewhat shackled and tempered homo economicus may no longer be 
perceived as an unbridled utility maximizer, but he/she is postulated to be 
behaving reasonably from a microeconomic angle.258  
The implication is that purely cognitive, or sociologically framed, 
accounts of agent conduct are regarded as inconsistent with empirical 
evidence because they are based on the premise that “[h]umans are not 
evaluators any more than ants, bees, or termites are evaluators”259 and that 
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 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
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people “are conventional and conformist, and their behavior is [solely] 
determined by the taboos, customs, mores, and traditions of the society in 
which they are born and raised.”260 Such essentially backward-looking 
explanatory schemes are also deemed to be at variance with the principles of 
the rule of law, which stipulate that agents should be held accountable for 
their actions.261 
There is thus good, albeit qualified, statistical support for rational 
choice models of crime and, by extension, corrupt practices.262 The data 
generally, although not uniformly, validate the time-honored assumption that 
economic motives are a key determinant of participation in crime.263 The 
picture conveyed is that, to a considerable extent, individuals do indeed 
decide whether to engage in crime by performing something akin to cost-
benefit calculation under uncertainty.264 In the process, they assess, not 
necessarily explicitly and formally, whether the anticipated benefits from 
crime (netting out the probability of being caught) outweigh the anticipated 
costs (normally expressed in terms of opportunity costs).265 
Two factors are posited to exert meaningful influence in this context by 
furnishing conflicting material incentives to agents.266 First, alternatives to 
crime are believed to affect the likelihood of committing an unlawful act.267 
The principal source of competing pressures is a person’s job, which 
 
4 (1994); Michael C. Jensen, Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives and Agency, 7 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 40 (1994). 
 260. See JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 259. See also 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 259; Jensen, Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives and Agency, 
supra note 259. 
 261. See Roda Mushkat, Greater China Constitutes Fertile Ground for ‘Building’ and 
‘Testing’ Positive International Legal Theory, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 354, 385 
(2016). 
 262. See generally Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal 
Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 453 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007); Mirko Draca & Stephen Machin, Crime and Economic Incentives, 7 
ANNUAL REV. ECON. 398 (2015); Aaron Chaplin & Justin McCray, Criminal Deterrence: A 
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5 (2017). 
 263. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
 264. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
 265. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
 266. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
 267. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
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provides him/her with a certainty equivalent payoff from wages.268 It follows 
that, if the wage available in the formal labor market is boosted, and all else 
stays constant, participation in crime should decline.269 Second, returns to 
crime are thought to pull agents in the opposite direction.270 Specifically, if 
profits from crime are greater, or are perceived to be greater, then, again all 
else being equal, participation in crime should rise.271 
Both these pathways entail a direct impact of material incentives on 
crime, including of the corrupt variety.272 The other transmission mechanism 
which looms large in standard microeconomic models of crime is the 
influence brought to bear on criminal behavior in the form of the indirect 
incentive effect generated via the deterrence and incapacitation strategies of 
the criminal justice system.273 Absent the presence of countervailing forces, 
an increase in criminal sanctions and enhancement, qualitative as well as 
quantitative, of criminal justice system capabilities should thus dampen 
incentives to commit unlawful acts, and vice versa.274 
In sum, rational choice models of crime (and corruption) postulate that, 
ceteris paribus, participation in these types of activities (excluding 
categories such as violent criminal behavior) is determined by a combination 
of incentives and deterrence.275 To express it more elaborately, the 
fundamental proposition is that increases in criminal earnings raise crime 
and increases in legal wages, the probability of being caught (a function of 
criminal justice system effectiveness), and the magnitude of sanction if 
caught lower crime.276 The models can be refined by abandoning the 
restrictive notion that the choice is binary, between legal work and its illicit 
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counterpart, and turning this into a time-allocation problem, whereby the two 
competing activities consume portions of time without being mutually 
exclusive.277 
The clause ceteris paribus implies that some relevant variables (e.g., 
education and its impact on crime/corrupt practices) are omitted.278 
Moreover, the models are static, overlooking the fact that many criminals are 
prolific offenders accumulating criminal human capital over a lengthy 
career.279 This pattern is captured by analytical schemes which highlight the 
dynamics of crime perpetrated by individuals over a life cycle (featuring the 
idea of crime onset, specialization, and desistence).280 Such limitations 
notwithstanding, even without conversion into complex multivariable 
structures, rational choice models of crime (and corruption) possess 
considerable explanatory power, predictability, and policy usefulness.281 
Attempts by LE researchers to rigorously grapple with the nature and 
containment of corrupt activities from a neoclassical microeconomic 
perspective have been questioned on grounds other than the putative 
preoccupation with narrow-centered utility maximization. Critics have 
asserted that the emphatic differentiation between the private and public 
domains, laying stress on the symptoms of dysfunctionality rife in the latter, 
and insistence that it furnishes a unique habitat where corruption may freely 
mushroom all constitute a misplaced intellectual endeavor.282 To lend 
credence to this expression of disapproval, they point to the experience of 
Northern European and Scandinavian countries, which have relatively large 
and regulation-minded governments, but boast a low level of corruption.283 
Again, this is an outdated and overly simplistic portrayal of the 
underpinnings of the rational choice conceptual façade. The Northern 
European and Scandinavian patterns may satisfactorily (albeit not fully) be 
 
 277. See generally Lance Lochner, Education, Work and Crime: A Human Capital 
Approach, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 811 (2004); Lance Lochner, Non-Production Benefits of 
Education: Crime, Health, and Good Citizenship, in 4 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
EDUCATION 183 (Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, & Ludger Woessmann eds. 2011). 
 278. See generally Lochner, Education, Work and Crime, supra note 277; Lochner, Non-
Production Benefits of Education: Crime, Health, and Good Citizenship, supra note 277. 
 279. See generally Stephen Machin and Olivier Marie, Reducing Crime by Targeting 
Prolific Offenders, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267411939_Reducing_Crime_ 
by_Targeting_Prolific_Offenders (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
 280. See generally Lochner, Education, Work and Crime, supra note 277. 
 281. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262; 
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262. 
 282. See Jancsics, supra note 225, at 359-360. 
 283. See id. at 360. 
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explained with recourse to traditional (e.g., high standard of living, coupled 
with substantial benefits, monetary and nonmonetary, enjoyed by public 
sector employees) and augmented (e.g., education) microeconomic 
formulations.284 More importantly, rational choice models—including those 
focused on corrupt practices—liberally acknowledge market failures such as 
excessive concentration of economic power (monopoly and its offshoots), 
public goods, externalities, and asymmetric information, to mention just the 
most glaring examples of departure from perfect competition.285 
Critics counter, in a contrarian fashion, that a highly competitive market 
environment is not a panacea because intense competition may prompt 
agents to try to maximize opportunities and minimize threats by resorting to 
rent-seeking.286 Still, it is recognized that the empirical evidence is 
ambiguous in this respect.287 Notably, players in a fiercely competitive 
market setting, characterized by diffusion of organizational power and 
institutional fragmentation, may lack the necessary resources to effectively 
pursue regulatory capture.288 Indeed, it is government failure, both 
substantive and procedural, which may sow the seeds of market failure and 
pave the way for the proliferation of corrupt activities.289 
It is noteworthy that one of the most ubiquitous applications of rational 
choice theory to corruption—the principal-agent model—is firmly rooted in 
market failure territory or, to be more precise, its asymmetric information 
 
 284. See generally Theobald, supra note 226; Robinson, supra note 226; Bracking ed., 
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 285. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 226, at 189-209; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226, 13-
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repec.org/paper/upfupfgen/1525.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).   
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PUB. CHOICE 1 (2015); William R. Keech, Michael C. Munger, & Carl Simon, Market Failure 
and Government Failure, http://michaelmunger.com/papers/keechmungersimon.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2020  4:08 PM 
174 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
 
segment.290 A principal-agent problem emerges in situations where one or 
more actors (individuals, group, organizations, or another collective 
entity)—the “agents”—are entrusted with authority to act on behalf of some 
other individual or collective entity (the “principal”).291 Depending on the 
context, the principal might be a specific identifiable actor or set of actors 
(like a bureaucratic supervisor or the shareholders of a corporation).292 
Alternatively, the “principal” might be characterized as “society,” to reflect 
the idea that certain agents (like political leaders and public servants) are 
supposed to act in the best interests of the community.293 However, due to 
information asymmetry favoring the agent(s), the principal(s) often cannot 
perfectly monitor and control delegates, which gives rise to the risk that the 
agent(s) may act in his/her/its/their own interest, rather than that of the 
principal(s).294 
The quintessential neoclassical solution to the problem is through 
proper incentive and punishment mechanisms.295 Quantitative data are thus 
adduced to evince that high public sector salaries depress corrupt 
practices.296 Statistical findings also suggest that the principal(s) should drive 
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up the costs of corruption for the agent(s) embroiled in unlawful activities.297 
The empirical findings include those generated in laboratory-like 
experiments, lending support to the view that increased detection and heavy 
sanctions discourage agents from engaging in corrupt practices.298 Ideas have 
also been put forward as to how to minimize monitoring and control costs 
for principals and further push up transaction costs for agents through 
various innovative schemes.299 On their part, behaviorally inclined LE 
researchers have shown that unlawful agent conduct may be the product of 
cognitive biases stemming from the misperception of contexts, risks, and 
other relevant variables impinging on the individual and collective decision 
process.300 
A thorny challenge is confronted, acutely so in the public realm, when 
both the principal(s) (generally politician[s] but even entire societies) and the 
agent(s) (typically bureaucrat[s] but can be politicians as well) are corrupt, 
with the community facing a collective action problem.301 While principal-
agent theory can be said to lie at the interface between neoclassical 
economics and its institutional counterpart, in that it acknowledges that 
corruption may be an organizational as well as individual issue (“bad barrel” 
versus “bad apple”) and incorporates elements of property rights and 
transaction costs, it is not sufficiently broad-based to address this challenge 
in a wide-ranging manner. Such conceptual and practical difficulties 
ineluctably lead LE scholars concerned with corrupt activities into the sphere 
of institutional economics (encompassing the fast growing constitutional 
ingredient).302 
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This paradigm does not negate the significance of incentives.303 It 
places strong emphasis, however, on the normative and institutional 
structures, formal and informal, in which illegal transactions are 
embedded.304 Individuals and collective entities are believed to regard these 
exogenous structural configurations, or constraints, as given and are thought 
to navigate accordingly, whether in an optimal or a satisficing fashion.305 
Therein is found the difference between institutional economics and 
economic sociology. The latter lays equal stress on norms, institutions, and 
social embedding as forces shaping human behavior, but it downplays the 
importance of goal-oriented maneuvering, whether optimal or satisficing in 
nature.306 Institutional economists also proceed on the assumption that, for 
better or worse, people possess the capacity to construct social norms and 
institutions, whereas economic sociologists do not accord much weight to 
this proposition.307 
The institutional economic agenda thus centers on the inadequacies of 
the normative underpinnings of the legal, political, and administrative edifice 
and its structural flaws.308 The need has been firmly underlined for credible 
system-wide accountability, elevated transparency, viable information 
disclosure coupled with easy access to its sources, organizational checks-
and-balances, rule of law, judicial independence, well-delineated and readily 
enforceable property rights, robust procedures for minimizing opportunities 
for regulatory cartelization and capture, freedom of the media, fostering 
societal trust (with the exception of that permeating corrupt networks), 
impairing governance mechanisms underlying the entrenchment/path 
dependency of corruption, containing transaction costs, eroding the 
foundations of corrupt relational contracting, eliminating or at least seriously 
handicapping intermediaries facilitating corruption, streamlining 
government acquisition and provision of goods and services, recalibrating 
bureaucratic entry (recruitment and selection), mitigating conflicts of 
interest, pursuing strategies designed to promote ethical conduct, forging 
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multilateral policy cooperation, and embracing a holistic approach that 
considers the normative-institutional fabric in its entirety.309 
A key issue which has long vexed institutional economists is the 
relationship between the structure of government, particularly the degree of 
political centralization/decentralization, and corruption.310 Drawing on 
insights derived from conventional industrial organization theory, LE 
researchers have tended to posit that decentralization is likely to spur corrupt 
activities, without necessarily implying that centralization is invariably a 
dependable remedy for the problem.311 Both in their decentralized and 
centralized incarnation, corrupt practices exert pernicious influence but, on 
balance, the former structural constellation appears to be more conducive to 
corruption, although the fact that a highly centralized government may be 
saddled with a markedly decentralized system of corruption complicates the 
picture.312 
This line of reasoning has been challenged by scholars identified with 
the new institutional economics (NIE).313 They have advocated reforms 
featuring devolution of service delivery, contracting out, purchaser-provider 
split, and greater competition on the grounds that, in such an environment, 
accountability is enhanced by the exercise of exit and voice by citizens and 
subnational governments’ ability to adapt strategies to local needs.314 It has 
been argued that some of the positive effects engendered in the process may 
dissipate, however, because decentralization inevitably lowers ex ante and 
ex post transaction costs for corrupt agents as the number of bureaucratic 
layers is reduced, leading to potentially higher levels of corruption.315 
LE researchers of all persuasions pay close attention to the economic 
consequences of corrupt activities.316 The earlier view was that corruption 
should not be regarded as a cost but the ineluctable product of structural 
impediments to growth and, as such, an element in the developmental 
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dynamics capable of boosting efficiency by “greasing the wheels of the 
economy.”317 Generally speaking, however, this unorthodox position no 
longer finds meaningful support in the academic literature on the subject.318 
Rather, the consensus opinion currently reflects the belief that corrupt 
practices are the source of a host of distortions and inefficiencies, and thus a 
hindrance to socioeconomic progress.319 
It is true that, in certain circumstances, corruption may augment the 
income of low-paid public employees, but it more often transfers resources 
to the rich and privileged.320 Moreover, gains from corrupt activities are 
unlikely to be invested in the productive sector of the economy.321 To make 
matters worse, proceeds from such pursuits, when undertaken on a large 
scale, tend to be channeled to foreign bank accounts, resulting in a leakage 
of domestic capital without any ensuing resource distribution.322 On the 
fiscal side, the harmful effects of corruption manifest themselves in declining 
efficiency and rising prices of public services.323 The private sector is not 
immune to the malaise because the upward pressure on costs stifles 
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productivity.324 On a more general level, flagrant corruption may undermine 
economic stability, government legitimacy, and the rule of law.325 
A recent study questions some elements of the consensus view 
regarding the relationship between corrupt practices and economic 
performance.326 Specifically, the empirical findings offered therein suggest 
that institutions may play the role of an intervening or mediating variable in 
determining the outcome of the interaction between these two factors.327 
Thus, in fragile States where an institutional vacuum prevails, however 
disagreeable this may sound, a modicum of corruption may indeed “grease 
the wheels of the economy,” by providing the necessary “lubricant.”328 The 
institutional dynamics, if any, may also impinge on the interplay between 
corrupt activities and economic growth, which is the principal focus of the 
survey.329 
The growing academic LE literature on corruption hence continues to 
highlight, in a neoclassical (“reward-and-punishment”) fashion, the 
importance of material incentives and criminal justice system effectiveness 
in influencing the propensity to engage in corrupt practices, but no longer to 
the exclusion of other relevant variables. Institutional and behavioral 
economics have come to the fore and have stretched, at least at the margin, 
the boundaries of this policy-centered field of scientific inquiry. A more 
diverse picture, perhaps less clear-cut but to a greater extent in tune with 
intricate socioeconomic realities, has consequently emerged, with 
implications for both the exploration of the roots of corruption and strategies 
to combat its symptoms. 
 
VI. The Era of Xi Jinping 
 
 
 324. See generally Geeta Batra, Daniel Kaufman, & Andrew H. W. Stone, The Firms 
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on Private 
Sector Development, (Oct. 2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=541388. 
 325. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 226; ROSE-ACKERMAN & PALFIKA, 
supra note 226. 
 326. See generally de Vaal & Ebben, supra note 225. 
 327. See generally id. 
 328. See generally id. 
 329. See generally id. See also Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, Public Investment and 
Fiscal Performance in the New EU Member States, 32 FISCAL STUD. 43 (2011); Jan Hanousek 
& Anna Kochanova, Bribery Environment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Central 
and Eastern European Countries (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 
DP10499, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584017. 
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Since its founding, the PRC has had two transformative leaders: Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.330 The former fundamentally altered the 
bourgeois-like political landscape while keeping the country in a state of 
permanent turmoil and isolated from the outside world, whereas the latter 
recommercialized the sagging revolutionary facade and restored stability by, 
inter alia, promoting rule-based governance (not to be equated with the rule 
of law) and economic opening.331 Deng was succeeded by two non-path-
breaking leaders, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who faithfully adhered to his 
policy agenda without broadening and deepening it substantially.332 Hu, in 
particular, has been singled out for becoming hamstrung by the complexities 
of collective decision-making and succumbing to institutional inertia.333 
It is a moot point whether this constitutes an entirely fair assessment.334 
Hu and his de facto partner, Premier Wen Jiabao, were able to sustain 
economic growth and minimize vulnerability to exogenous shocks in the 
wake of the 2008/09 global financial crisis.335 The two leaders, especially 
Hu, were also instrumental in dramatically improving relations with Taiwan, 
perhaps their greatest achievement.336 Moreover, while it is now fashionable 
and possibly politically expedient to present this as a sign of weakness, Hu 
and Wen were, by CCP standards, genuine consensus-builders, to a degree 
apparently unlikely to be seen for the foreseeable future.337 
After serving two five-year terms, both Hu and Wen retired in 2012, in 
accordance with the leadership succession norms and rules promulgated by 
Deng Xiaoping,338 with the former giving up his positions as General 
Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC, and Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (as well as the elusive “Paramount Leader” status).339 
 
 330. See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 
(2013). 
 331. See generally id.  
 332. See generally WILLY W. L. LAM, THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN (1999); WILLY W. L. LAM, 
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: NEW LEADERS, NEW CHALLENGES (2006). 
 333. See generally LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: NEW LEADERS, NEW 
CHALLENGES, supra note 332. 
 334. See generally Kerry Brown, What Did Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Do for China?, 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21669780. 
 335. See id. 
 336. See id. 
 337. See id.  
 338. See generally Zhengxu Wang & Anastas Vangeli, The Rules and Norms of 
Leadership Succession in China: From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and Beyond, 76 CHINA 
J. 24 (2016). 
 339. See generally id. 
2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2020  4:08 PM 
Summer 2020] Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Junping” 181 
 
They were replaced in an orderly fashion by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with 
no indications that the Deng-prescribed delicate balancing act, consisting of 
a measure of separation between party and State (Xi’s and Li’s putative 
spheres of influence, respectively) in a finely calibrated (again, by CCP 
standards) system of potentially divergent forces would not persist for a long 
time to come.340  
The expectation of path dependency on the leadership front may have 
been wholly realistic, given the experience of the previous four decades, but 
it has not materialized.341 Rather uncharacteristically, China has witnessed a 
marked departure from the well-entrenched pattern of incremental 
adaptation342—a dramatic u-turn akin to “punctuated equilibrium.”343 While 
Xi’s reformist credentials are significantly overstated,344 there can be little 
doubt that he has substantially reconfigured the Deng-inspired Chinese 
governance regime and the vision underlying it, subject to the qualification 
that mean reversion and even sharp swings of the political pendulum in the 
opposite direction can never be ruled out in China.345  
 
 340. See generally id. 
 341. See generally CHINA ENTERING THE XI JINPING ERA (Yongnian Zheng & Lance P. 
Gore eds., 2014); WILLY W. L. LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING: 
RENAISSANCE, REFORM, OR RETROGRESSION? (2015); ROBERT ROSS & JO I. BEKKEVOLD, 
CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES (2016); CHINA 
IN THE XI JINPING ERA (Steve Tsang & Honghua Men eds., 2016); Robert D. Blackwill & Kurt 
M. Campbell, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy under a Powerful but 
Exposed Leader, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 2016, Council Special Report No. 
74, https://www.cfr.org/report/xi-jinping-global-stage. 
 342. See generally CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
INCREMENTALISM (Peter Nolan & Qimiao Fan eds., 1994); Yongnian Zheng, Political 
Incrementalism: Political Lessons from China’s 20 Years of Reform, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 
1157 (1999); Yijia Jing, Creative Incrementalism: Governance Reforms in China Since 1978, 
2 CHINESE POL. SCI. REV. 56 (2017).   
 343. See generally Weixing Hu, Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait 
Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 21 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 933 (2012); Kwan Nok 
Chan & Shuang Zhao, Punctuated Equilibrium and the Information Disadvantage of 
Authoritarianism: Evidence from the People’s Republic of China, 44 POL’Y STUD. J. 134 
(2016).   
 344. See generally Jonathan Fenby, Xi Jinping Is Not a Reformer but China’s Most 
Authoritarian Leader Since Mao, SPECTATOR (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.spectator. 
co.uk/2017/10/xi-jinping-is-not-a-reformer-but-chinas-most-authoritarian-leader-since-mao/ 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
 345. See generally Jonathan Fenby, Xi Jinping Is Not a Reformer but China’s Most 
Authoritarian Leader Since Mao, SPECTATOR (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.spectator. 
co.uk/2017/10/xi-jinping-is-not-a-reformer-but-chinas-most-authoritarian-leader-since-mao/ 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
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Deng is best remembered for revitalizing the long-moribund Chinese 
economy through a two-pronged strategy of domestic marketization and 
external opening.346 He also embarked on far-reaching institutional 
reengineering, however, to avert reemergence of Mao Zedong’s so-called 
“one-voice chamber.”347 The underlying rationale was that, to prevent the re-
occurrence of traumatic experiences such as the Great Leap Forward and 
Cultural Revolution, it was essential to substitute the rule of law, coupled 
with the primacy of institutions, for the “rule of personality.”348 Accordingly, 
he instituted a collective form of leadership, with the CCP General Secretary 
operating as at most “first among equals”; pursued the separation of party 
and State; implemented the principle of “five lakes and four seas,” or 
delegation of authority to subnational units; jettisoned the reliance on large-
scale campaigns/mass movements to achieve ideological goals; and took 
concrete steps to depoliticize/professionalize the military.349 
Xi has persistently and systematically overturned the first four pillars 
of this multifaceted blueprint and has selectively but crucially impaired the 
fifth.350 The notion of collective leadership was quickly consigned to 
oblivion: “Almost from day one, the new supreme leader started a power 
grab that [was] as stunning as it [was] inimical to Deng’s ideals about putting 
institutions ahead of individuals.”351 Over time, a series of shrewd political 
and structural maneuvers, the latest allowing the President to hold 
indefinitely the reins of power,352 has enabled Xi to “ride roughshod over the 
entire Party-military establishment.”353 Consequently, “[t]he theory and 
practice of … collective leadership have been dealt a body blow.”354 This 
drastic shift has been given official recognition with the designation of Xi as 
the country’s “core leader” and the addition to the party’s constitution of his 
“thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.”355 
 
 346. See generally VOGEL, supra note 330. 
 347. See LAM, supra note 341, at xii. 
 348. See id. 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. at xii-xiv. 
 351. Id. at xiii. 
 352. See generally Choi Chi-yuk, Jun Mai & Matt Ho, China Will Scrap Limit on 
Presidential Terms, Meaning Xi Jinping Can Stay On, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 25, 
2018, 4:15 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2134624/china-
will-scrap-limit-presidents-term-meaning-xi. 
 353. LAM, supra note 341, at xiii. 
 354. Id. 
 355. See generally Lance P. Gore, Elevating Xi Jinping to the “Core” of Chinese 
Leadership, 8 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 5 (2016); Shi Jiangtao, Congress Concludes with President 
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Xi has also sharply deviated from three of Deng’s strategic tenets 
relating to the modus operandi of the governance regime.356 First, he has 
greatly tightened the CCP’s grip on all aspects of sociopolitical life, private 
and public, with the separation between party and State becoming a thing of 
the past357 and the CCP reverting to its above-the-law status (i.e., rule of law 
mutating into rule by law and possibly rule of man).358 Second, he has 
reembraced factionalism, an anathema to Deng, on a scale exceeding that of 
his two predecessors by crashing rival networks and surrounding himself 
with a coterie of trusted loyalists.359 Third, he has adopted a “top-level 
institutional design,” reimposing firm central government control over 
subnational units.360 Fourth, he has resurrected “Maoist political campaigns 
with a gusto.”361 
Additionally, while selectively promoting professionalism in the 
military domain, Xi has reversed Deng’s practice of endeavoring to keep the 
generals at bay.362 Specifically, he has significantly boosted the military 
budget and has brought generals into the epicenter of the political arena.363 
Having previously served as secretary to a defense minister, Xi has a 
penchant for military affairs and has spearheaded the transfer of a record 
number of former senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers and 
defense industry officials to key party and government positions, 
proclaiming in his capacity as commander in chief that “I, too am a military 
man who has become a cadre [in civilian departments].”364 
 
Xi Jinping as Undisputed “Core” Leader, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 24, 2017, 10:15 
PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116830/congress-conclude 
s-xi-undisputed-core-leader. 
 356. See LAM, supra note 341, at xiii-xiv. 
 357. See generally Lance P. Gore, Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese 
Communist Party under Xi Jinping, 8 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 5 (2017); Sabine Muscat & Matthias 
Stepan, In Xi’s China, the Party Morphs into the State, MERCATOR INSTITUTE FOR CHINA 
STUDIES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.merics.org/en/blog/xis-china-party-morphs-state. 
 358. See generally Gore, supra note 357; George G. Chen, Le Droit, C’est Moi: Xi 
Jinping’s New Rule-by-Law Approach, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (July 26, 2017), http:// 
ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/le-droit-cest-moi-xi-jinpings-new-rule-by-law-approach; Zachary Keck, 
4th Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 20, 2014), https:// 
thediplomat.com/2014/10/4th-plenum-rule-of-law-with-chinese-characteristics/. 
 359. See LAM, supra note 341at xiii-xiv. 
 360. See id. at xiv. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. 
 364. Id. 
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A heavy concentration of power and its determined projection, coupled 
with inexorable top-down steering and vigorous suppression of autonomous 
bottom-up forces, have been the hallmarks of the Xi era strategic 
initiatives.365 At home, the cult of personality has resurfaced in forms unseen 
since the late 1970s,366 ideological indoctrination has been intensified,367 
nationalist sentiment has been whipped up,368 access to information has been 
curtailed,369 crackdown on civil society has been stepped up,370 ethnic 
minority rights have been scaled back,371 State capitalism has regained its 
upper hand over its market counterpart,372 central planning has been 
revived,373 industrial policy has been relaunched,374 and the party has 
 
 365. See id. at xiv-xvii. See also ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI 
JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE (2018). 
 366. See generally Wang Xiangwei, As Fears of Xi’s Personality Cult Deepen, China 
Must Dial Down the Propaganda, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 24, 2018, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2138481/fears-xis-personality-cult-deepen-
china-must-dial-down-propaganda. 
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in Xi Jinping’s China, FOREIGN POLICY ASS’N (Apr. 5, 2016), https://foreignpolicyblogs. 
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Nationalism, NATIONAL INTEREST (Aug. 28, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ 
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Politics, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 5, 2018, 11:06 AM), https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ 
listeningpost/2018/03/xi-jinping-power-grab-china-media-politics-180303110448732.html; 
Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china. 
 370. See generally HONG KONG FREE PRESS, Cyberspace, Religion, Lawyers, Dissidents: 
China’s Shrinking Civil Society under Xi Jinping’s Crackdown (Oct. 18, 2017, 11:29 AM), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/18/cyberspace-religion-lawyers-dissidents-chinas-sh 
rinking-civil-society-xi-jinpings-crackdown/. 
 371. See generally Associated Press, Human Rights in China under Xi Jinping “Worst 
since Tiananmen Crackdown”: Amnesty, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 17, 2017, 11:15 
AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120318/human-rights-chi 
na-under-xi-jinping-worst-tiananmen. 
 372. See generally Roland Rajah, Xi Jinping’s State Capitalism Is Here to Stay, LOWY 
INSTITUTE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/xi-jinping-state-capi 
talism-here-stay. 
 373. See generally Andrew Browne, China Uses “Digital Leninism” to Manage Economy 
and Monitor Citizens: Xi Jinping Is Leading China into a Big-Data Dictatorship, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:57 AM), https:// www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-leads-china-into-big-
data-dictatorship-1508237820. 
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Challenge, Business Group Says, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://blogs.wsj. 
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expanded its tentacles into the far reaches of the sprawling economy.375 
Abroad, for all intents and purposes, Hu’s vision of a harmonious world376 
and good neighbor policy377 been rendered null and void,378 replaced with an 
ambitious drive to establish a subservient regional regime akin to the 
Imperial tributary system379—as evidenced by muscle flexing in the South 




 375. See generally Keith Zhai, China’s Xi to Tighten Communist Party Grip on Economic 
Life, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-06/china-s-xi-readies-sweeping-government-overhaul-to-empower-party. 
 376. See generally JEAN-MARC F. BLANCHARD ET AL., “HARMONIOUS WORLD” AND 
CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY (Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard eds., 2008); CHINA 
IN SEARCH OF HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo eds., 2008); Liu Jianfei, 
Sino-US Relations and Building a Harmonious World, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 479 (2009); 
ROSITA DELLIOS & R. JAMES FERGUSON, CHINA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL ORDER: FROM 
PEACEFUL RISE TO HARMONIOUS WORLD (2013); CHIUNG-CHIU HUANG & CHIH-YU SHIH, 
HARMONIOUS INTERVENTION: CHINA’S QUEST FOR RELATIONAL SECURITY (2014); CHIH-YU 
SHIH, SINICIZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SELF, CIVILIZATION, AND INTELLECTUAL 
POLITICS IN SUBALTERN EAST ASIA (2013); Chih-Yu Shih & Jiwu Yin, Between Core National 
Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-Role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign 
Policy, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 59 (2013); ASTRID H. M. NORDIN, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND HARMONIOUS WORLD: TIME, SPACE, AND MULTIPLICITY IN WORLD POLITICS 
(Jeny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams eds., 2016).   
 377. See generally Robert Sutter, China’s Good Neighbor Policy and its Implications for 
Taiwan, 13 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 717 (2004); Chien-peng Chung, The “Good Neighbour 
Policy” in the Context of China’s Foreign Relations, 7 CHINA: INT’L J. 107 (2009); CHIEN-
PENG CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: 
INSTITUTIONALIZING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY” (2010); Maria D. Cabras, China’s 
Peaceful Rise and the Good Neighbor Policy, EUROPEAN STRATEGIST (Dec. 11, 2011), http:// 
www.eurstrat.eu/chinas- peaceful-rise-and-the-good-neighbor-policy/. 
 378. See generally Niall Duggan, Harmonious World: It Seems It Was Only a Dream, 19 
INT’L STUD. REV. 328 (2017); Chris Buckley, Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good Neighbor, or Assert 
China’s Power?, NEW YORK TIMES: SINOSPHERE, DISPATCHES FROM CHINA (June 12, 2014, 
1:49 AM), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/xi-of-two-minds-be-a-good-nei 
ghbor-or-assert-chinas-power/?_r=0. 
 379. See generally John Garver, China Rules the World?, https://www.chinacenter.net/ 
2016/china_currents/15-2/china-rules-world/. 
 380. See generally BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN 
ASIA (2014); RICHARD Q. TURCSÁNYI, CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: 
POWER SOURCES, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND REACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY (2017). 
 381. See generally TAI WEI LIM, HENRY CHAN, KATHERINE TSENG & WEN XIN LIM, 
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breathe life into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an alternative 
to the United States/Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank.382 
This policy thrust is the embodiment of a distinctly neo-authoritarian 
outlook,383 in all likelihood reflecting not merely Xi’s beliefs and concerns, 
but also his chosen leadership pathway and decision-making style.384 Despite 
his high visibility, Xi remains something of a mystery385 and, impressions to 
the contrary notwithstanding, he appears to be less predictable and to possess 
a more multidimensional personality than commonly assumed.386 This 
renders it difficult to place his conduct as the head of State and the way he 
addresses challenges/problems within the framework of available 
taxonomies which, by their very nature, aim to abstract from reality and to 
reduce social phenomena to “ideal types.”387 
Despite such difficulties, a degree of clarity and coherence may be 
achieved by imposing a modicum of structure on a behavioral phenomenon 
characterized by a measure of haziness and intricacy. Political leadership has 
been studied extensively and several typologies have been developed in the 
process.388 The ones most relevant in this context appear to be those devised 
 
 382. See generally TANG SIEW MUN, THE POLITICS OF THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) (2015); MING WAN, THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
BANK: THE CONSTRUCTION OF POWER AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EAST ASIAN 
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 383. See LAM, supra note 341, at xvi-xvii. 
 384. See generally id. at 34-150; Lance L. P. Gore, What is Xi Jinping Made of: Xi in His 
Own Words, 7 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 30 (2017); Wei Shan, Xi Jinping’s Policy Style, 8 EAST 
ASIAN POL’Y 42 (2016); Jeffrey Hays, Xi Jinping’s Style, Leadership and Personality Cult: 
Xi Jinping as the Leader of China, FACTS AND DETAILS (Sept. 2016), http://factsand 
details.com/china/cat2/4sub5/entry-4302.html; Richard McGregor, Xi Jinping Moment, 
LOWY INSTITUTE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/xi-jinping-mom 
ent; Andrew Van Dam, We Looked at Almost 100 Leaders Who Tried Xi Jinping-Style  
Power Grabs. Here’s How They Turned Out, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/15/a-brief-93-part-history-of-pow 
er-grabs-from-ferdinand-marcos-to-xi-jinping/. 
 385. See generally Tom Plate, Why Xi Jinping Remains an International Man of Mystery 
to Most in the US, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:50 PM), http://www.scmp. 
com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1897943/why-xi-jinping-remains-international-man-m 
ystery-most-us. 
 386. See generally Wei, supra note 384. 
 387. See generally Udo Kuckartz, Ideal Types or Empirical Types: The Case of Max 
Weber’s Empirical Research, 31 BULLETIN DE METHODOLOGIE SOCIOLOGIQUE 44 (1991). 
 388. See generally THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
(Joseph Masciulli, Mikhail A. Molchanov & W. Andy Knight eds., 2009); OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (R. A. W. Rhodes & Paul T. Hart eds., 2014). 
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by Brown389 and Deutsch.390 The former has identified four categories, not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, in which political leaders may be placed: 
redefining, transformational, revolutionary, and totalitarian.391 The 
redefining pattern constitutes a new addition to the analytical vocabulary and 
is equated with a tendency to reconfigure the parameters of politics by 
repositioning the regime in terms of what is desirable and feasible.392 
Deutsch, on the other hand, has chosen to adhere to the traditional distinction 
between strong and weak leadership modalities, but has combined it with the 
breadth/depth of support enjoyed by the leader and the fit between his/her 
strategies and the prevailing circumstances.393 
The academic literature on political leaders’/policy styles is distinctly 
sparse, by comparison. The classical work of Richardson and his 
collaborators, published nearly four decades ago, remains virtually the sole 
meaningful contribution in this pivotal area of scientific inquiry.394 After 
carefully surveying the Western European scene, his team concluded that a 
leader’s modus operandi could be located within a space occupied by two 
continuums ranging from a consensual relationship/style to one marked by 
coercion/imposition and  from anticipatory/active problem-solving to 
reactive problem-solving.395 While this classification is the product of an 
empirical encounter with region-specific, rather than worldwide, realities, it 
is sufficiently grounded in broad-based conceptual schemes to be deemed 
generally valuable.396 
Given the picture presented in this section, it may confidently be argued 
that Xi is a strong head of State who has attained wide support or at least one 
who does not face any consequential opposition. Although some observers 
might be inclined to depict Xi’s actions as transformative, it is more 
appropriate to regard him as a redefining leader and, if not totalitarian, then 
as quasi-totalitarian in his orientation. It is premature to authoritatively 
assess the situational fitness of the entire package of Xi’s strategies, 
 
 389. See generally ARCHIE BROWN, THE MYTH OF THE STRONG LEADER: POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP IN THE MODERN AGE (2014). 
 390. See generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (3d 
ed. 1988). 
 391. See BROWN, supra note 389, at 101-203. 
 392. See id. at 101-147. 
 393. See DEUTSCH, supra note 390, at 71-73. 
 394. See generally Jeremy Richardson, Gunnel Gustafson, & Grant Jordan, The Concept 
of Policy Style, in POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE 1 (Jeremy Richardson ed. 1982). 
 395. See id. at 10-14. 
 396. See id. 
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particularly from a long-term perspective but, the aura of invincibility 
projected notwithstanding, there is no compelling reason to assume that the 
vision pursued and the tactics employed will inevitably serve the country 
well overall, due to inadequate investment in social and institutional 
capital,397 subject to the qualification that the emerging Chinese governance 
model could prove to be a historical outlier.398 Xi’s style is obviously 
coercive in nature, relying heavily on top-down imposition. Insofar as 
anticipation versus reaction is concerned, he can be said to be forward 
looking, yet when it comes to implementation, risk taking on the political 
front often gives way to risk aversion on the economic side. 
A highly centralized and personalized regime, presided over by a 
“strongman,” who is neither constrained by pockets of credible opposition 
nor hampered procedurally, and who is willing to selectively but forcefully 
redefine the status quo could either breed or stifle corruption. From a purely 
statistical perspective, the odds favor the former outcome.399 This case may 
be different, however, in that combating corrupt activities synergistically 
serves both the opportunistic/personal and larger/strategic goals of the 
country’s leadership. It may simultaneously be relied upon as a tool for 
suppressing resistance and consolidating power and as a vehicle for CCP 
revival and national rejuvenation. The ongoing battle against such socio-
legal ills has thus ineluctably become perhaps the most prominent feature of 
the Xi era and inextricably intertwined with his heavily loaded political 
agenda. 
 
VII. The Current Anticorruption Campaign 
 
As indicated previously, crusades against the abuse of power, public 
and private, particularly the former, have ample precedent in China. Indeed, 
they have deep historical roots.400 Notably, in the early years of the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese emperors were profoundly troubled by the 
breadth and severity of corrupt practices and literally obsessed with 
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unearthing and suppressing them.401 An elaborate network of “touring 
inspectors” was established and relied upon to spot instances of graft.402 
Parties presumed to be guilty of such transgressions were harshly dealt with: 
“Bribe-taking officials were flayed before execution and their skin attached 
to mannequins in ‘scarecrow temples’ to serve as warnings to others. In more 
serious cases entire clans were put to death.”403 
This strategy did not prove successful, because of its inherent flaws and 
loss of momentum.404 Despite the wide scope and great intensity of the initial 
drive, the Ming dynasty unraveled under the weight of its corrupt 
bureaucracy and was consigned to the dustbin of history by the invading 
Manchu armies.405 Nevertheless, in addition to bringing into focus the 
potential threat to the regime the prevalence of graft poses, with the imperial 
“Mandate of Heaven” inevitably surrendered due to the pervasiveness of 
graft, this episode serves as a useful reminder of the historical undercurrents 
shaping the anticorruption campaigns in China, their marked symbolic 
connotations, and ultimately their strategic prominence.406 
The early Ming dynasty years saw ambitious policy initiatives on other 
fronts as well. Above all, its rulers aspired to revive Chinese culture and 
tradition.407 In parallel, they sought to modernize the economy, specifically 
its mainstay: the sprawling agricultural sector.408 These efforts were also 
conceptually and structurally suboptimal409 but, in conjunction with the 
vigorous drive to eradicate corrupt activities, they helped to keep the riven 
with contradictions and fundamentally vulnerable empire alive for as long as 
276 years, a no mean achievement, given the circumstances.410 The historical 
lesson here is that fighting graft is a multifaceted enterprise.411 
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This lesson has apparently been heeded by China’s present leadership 
whose anticorruption campaign bears strategic, as well as operational, 
similarities to the early Ming dynasty thrust.412 It is thus an integral part of 
the vision, realistic or otherwise, and not without politically derived tactical 
underpinnings, to realize the “Chinese dream” by erasing the lingering 
memories of the “Century of Humiliation”/”Hundred Years of National 
Humiliation” (1839-1939) and transforming the country, in the most 
comprehensive sense of the term, into a global superpower by 2049, the year 
coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.413 
The drive to quell corrupt practices has also been accompanied by the 
launch of a number of bold economic and national security schemes designed 
to position China robustly in the regional and global arenas. In the economic 
realm, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt-One Road 
mega project, referred to earlier, have been particularly noteworthy in this 
respect. In the national security sphere, the aforementioned military build-up 
and muscle flexing in the South China Sea have been equally striking.414 It 
should be reiterated, however, that the external economic initiatives have not 
been matched by major revitalization programs on the domestic front, with 
policy primarily geared toward maintaining stability through 
deleveraging/debt reduction415 and containing downward cyclical 
pressures.416 
At the outset of the Xi Jinping era, an inference might have been drawn 
that the multipronged strategy to pursue the Chinese dream, with the 
anticorruption campaign at its epicenter, would feature steady progress 
toward the rule of law,417 even if in a diluted form envisioned by some 
middle-of-the road reformist thinkers.418 This blueprint, grounded in China’s 
legalist tradition, was expected to consist of a six-pillar structure including 
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meaningful civil liberties (the freedoms of assembly, association, press, and 
speech being the most salient), an autonomous judiciary, an independent 
antigraft body, a powerful audit unit, a neutral civil service, and extensive 
social consultation procedures.419 It has become abundantly clear that most 
elements of this semiliberal roadmap no longer loom large on the CCP policy 
agenda.420 
Initial, mildly positive, expectations regarding evolution of the rule of 
law reflected policy rhetoric that seemed to depart from the reverse pattern 
observed in the preceding years.421 Specifically, at CCP’s Fourth Plenum, 
held in fall of 2014, the new leadership decided to abandon the official 
attitude toward the rule of law that emerged around 2005.422 The latter 
posture, a reaction to rising but unwelcome bottom-up legal and quasi-legal 
advocacy of a seemingly liberal nature,423 as well as the product of fears of 
escalating social unrest,424 constituted a discernible move away from the 
steps gradually taken to further the rule of law in the previous two decades.425 
The principal components of that negative stance were: 
 
[1] A shift away from late 20th-century efforts to promote 
judicial activism, coupled with a revival of late 1950s Maoist-era 
ideals of judicial populism. [2] A revived focus on mediation, 
rather than court trials, as a preferred mechanism for resolving 
conflict between citizens as well as between citizens and the 
[S]tate. [3] A new [S]tate narrative depicting the law as cold and 
unresponsive to citizen needs. [4] A stress on the courts as an 
undifferentiated cog within the [S]tate for stability maintenance 
(weiwen). [5] A steady reduction in tolerance for the activities of 
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public interest (weiquan) lawyers. [6] A new political campaign 
reiterating party supremacy over the constitution, law, and courts. 
[7] The charging of local officials with the priority task of 
containing citizen disputes, conflicts, and petitions at all costs.426 
 
Almost immediately after being catapulted into the political frontline, 
Xi Jinping signaled his intention to navigate the ship of State in the opposite 
direction.427 The CCP’s Fourth Plenum served as the most visible and 
effective platform for forcefully communicating the essence of the latest 
strategic turnabout.428 It was not, however, the sole vehicle for conveying the 
aim of resolutely pursuing legal reform.429 Importantly, the policy rhetoric 
was reinforced with the announcement of a series of concrete measures 
whose purpose was to convert the vision into reality.430 The resumed march 
toward the rule of law was expected to revolve around the following 
initiatives: 
 
[1] [Putting forward] [a]ssertions of legal and judicial reform as a 
central priority of Xi’s administration. [2] Attempts to centralize 
control over the judicial system and limit the influence of local 
officials. [3] A return to concepts of judicial professionalism. [4] 
Efforts to steer citizen disputes back to the courts. [5] Revived 
emphasis on adjudication and trials at the center of court work. [6] 
A renewed focus on the distinctions between the roles of judges 
and other [S]tate employees.431 
 
It has soon become amply evident, however, that the strategic 
readjustment has amounted to a structural rather than substantive 
reconfiguration.432 The managerial approach, and organizational foundation 
underpinning it, has been revamped, but the relationship between law, 
politics, and society has not been meaningfully redefined.433 A more 
formalistic and institutionally calibrated policy has been embraced without  
a corresponding ideational repositioning: “The top-down vision of legal 
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reform developing under Xi Jinping’s administration may have more in 
common with current trends in the party disciplinary apparatus or historical 
ones in the imperial Chinese censorate than it does with Western rule-of-law 
norms.”434 
As matters stand, significant legal outcomes continue to be shaped by 
the interplay between the “rule of the party” and the “rule of law.”435 An 
alignment between the two does occur, but misalignment is common.436 Such 
conflicts have always been resolved in favor of the former, but the 
institutional machinery erected by the present regime and its strategic thrust 
has rendered the asymmetry even more pronounced.437 Structural 
enhancements notwithstanding,438 this remains a major impediment to 
progress, prompting a seasoned observer of China’s legal scene to note that 
“[t]here is a Chinese saying that refers to Western medicine as a procedure 
that only treats the symptom, whereas Chinese medicine treats the root cause, 
[yet] [t]he Fourth Plenum initiative seems, ironically, very much like a strong 
dose of Western-style medicine, as far as the metaphor goes.”439   
This is not necessarily the product of risk aversion or the result of 
endogenously, let alone exogenously, derived constraints.440 The pro-rule-
of-law rhetoric, and the selective utilization of legal tools to promote a 
specific political agenda, and at the same time subversion of the principles 
underlying this institutional architecture are part of a coherent national 
strategy.441 Thus, while “[t]hroughout the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and 
Hu Jintao periods, law came to be expected to perform—and to some extent 
did perform—supporting functions for the regime’s core agenda: providing 
frameworks for market-oriented, internationally open development 
strategies; checking potentially development subverting misbehavior, much 
of it by party-[S]tate or [S]tate-linked actors; and preempting pressures for 
democratic reform … [i]ncipient and likely nontransformative changes in 
law’s mandate under Xi point toward a legal order that is still reformist and 
developmentalist (in its notion of the rule of law in the economy), more 
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legalist (that is, giving law a larger role in some, but not all, areas), and more 
Leninist (in the sense of being less liberal, more top-down, and more 
narrowly instrumentalist).”442  
The ongoing antigraft campaign, launched following the conclusion of 
the 18th National Congress of the CCP, held in 2012, in an unmistakably 
forceful but seemingly indeterminate fashion,443 is an integral component of 
this strategic blueprint.444 Its essence was conveyed in the form of an “eight-
point code” designed to govern official conduct (baxiang guiding).445 The 
rules laid out required public sector employees “to reconnect with the 
masses, banned the use of luxury cars, eliminated lavish gifts, and reduced 
pomp, banquets, ceremony, bureaucratic visits, and meetings.”446 A 
memorable phrase—four dishes and a soup (sicai yitang)—often invoked by 
CCP leaders to foster a spirit of frugality, was reembraced in order to infuse 
the austerity regime with symbolic virtue.447 
The time-honored and potent weapons of criticism and self-criticism, 
traditionally relied upon to sow fear and mistrust, were expected to be “well-
wielded with some spice to make every party official blush and sweat a 
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little.”448 More specifically and systematically, a “thorough cleanup”449 was 
to be undertaken of four objectionable work styles (sifeng): “formalism, 
bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance […] in reference to the three ill 
winds—subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing—that 
Mao Zedong cited during the Yan’an Rectification Movement in the 
1940s.450 In other words, it was devised as a top-down, suitably hazy, 
relentless, open-ended, and divisive (for better or for worse, in this particular 
context) social mobilization scheme. 
Formal legal mechanisms were identified by the post-2012 (“fifth-
generation”) controllers of politico-bureaucratic apparatus, as their policy 
agenda fully crystallized and began to be earnestly implemented, as a proper 
vehicle for tackling corrupt practices.451 Moreover, such tools have been 
selectively but repeatedly resorted to for this manifestly crucial purpose, as 
evidenced by the “criminal prosecution of several high-ranking ‘tigers’ 
(including Chongqing party chief and one-time aspirant to top leadership 
positions Bo Xilai and public security head Zhou Yongkang) and many more 
lower-ranked-’flies.’”452 
This has coincided, however, with the return of illiberal politics in its 
ultra-harsh incarnation, depriving the sweeping antigraft project of authentic 
rule-of-law underpinnings and rendering it a potential instrument for a 
widespread misuse of power.453 For instance, 
[a]ffiliates of civil society organizations that seek to promote 
legal change or to protect civil rights—such as the HIV and 
hepatitis B advocacy organization Yirenping or the five 
“feminists” on issues of domestic violence—have been subjected 
to police detention[, charged with] “picking quarrels and 
provoking troubles” (one of the so-called pocket offenses that 
have long been a much-criticized feature of Chinese criminal law), 
[and] prosecut[ed] for “illegal business operations” (which NGOs 
are often unable to escape because of registering lawfully as an 
NGO), “disturbing social order” (for small-scale protest or street 
theater), or tax evasion (including in connection with receiving 
funds from foreign sources.454 
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Such arbitrary and oppressive steps have been taken against the 
backdrop of broader legislative initiatives “to regulate the activities of 
foreign foundations, restrict funding for Chinese NGOs, and authorize 
measures to enhance [S]tate security—the last of these particularly reflecting 
concerns about ethno-nationalist unrest among Uyghurs.455 
These actions have been pursued against the backdrop of a putatively 
academic but in practice intensely managed debate about 
“constitutionalism,” evoking in a sharper form Hu Jintao-era repudiation of 
finely balanced Western-style politico-legal institutional constellations and 
the underlying tenets of “limited government, separation of power, and 
liberal rights—advocated by jailed Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, among 
others.”456 In the same spirit, the fifth generation leadership has sought to 
curb “discussion of seven pernicious ideas, including Western constitutional 
democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, and Western views 
of journalism.”457 The defensively restrictive climate that has emerged has 
proved a breeding ground for voices calling for materially limiting access to 
Western-type education, including in the field of law, to Chinese students.458 
Fragmentation and lack of check-and-balances within the 
anticorruption institutional machinery is another characteristic of the system 
within which the battle against graft is being waged, consisting of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), whose origins may be traced 
to the creation, in a quest to bolster party authority and consistency, of the 
CCP’s Discipline Supervision Commissions (DSCs) at the central and 
provincial levels in 1927; the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), 
established in 1949 with the aim of ensuring that government activities 
comply with the law and investigating and prosecuting serious crimes 
perpetrated by public officials; the Ministry of Supervision (MOS), formed 
in 1954, dissolved in 1959, and restored in 1986 for the purpose of curtailing 
corruption in the civil service; and the National Corruption Prevention 
Bureau (NCPB), launched in 2007 to primarily fill a gap stemming from the 
unavailability of organizational vehicles to address prevention and graft in 
the private sector.459 
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The mission of these entities is broadly defined and their operational 
domains partly overlap.460 The consequent institutional ambiguity and 
incoherence is not as pronounced as might have otherwise been the case due 
to the dominance of the CCDI461 and it is expected to diminish further when 
the new super anticorruption agency (National Supervisory Commission, 
NSC, set up in 2018) becomes fully functional.462 That said, organizational 
agendas and their implementation continue to be marked by a high degree of 
fuzziness and crisscrossing of institutional boundaries.463 Moreover, this 
remains an inordinately politicized edifice at all levels, not subject to any 
meaningful independent scrutiny, judicial or other.464 
The creation of the NSC, coupled with the introduction of the 
Supervision Law designed to govern its operations, while possibly holding 
the promise of better top-down steering and horizontal coordination, may 
well result in greater politicization, weaker accountability, and widespread 
abuse of power exceeding levels presently observed.465 Ostensibly, the 
underlying logic is to base the ongoing antigraft campaign on a juridically 
sound foundation and refrain from reliance on CCDI’s internal and extra-
legal mechanisms.466 This potent organization—effectively a fourth branch 
of the government, nominally coequal with the State Council (SC), Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC), and SPP, and granted an extraordinary mandate and 
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mighty investigative tools to boot—is to come under the purview of the CCP 
alone.467 
It is important to note that, whatever their merits and demerits, the 
political, rule-of-law, and structural underpinnings of the anticorruption 
program dovetail with the cardinal attributes of the current regime and its 
leaders’ modus operandi, as outlined above. Such friction-minimizing “fit” 
is, ceteris paribus, conducive to smooth implementation, or at least helps to 
dampen centrifugal forces.468 By the same token, there can be no doubt about 
the campaign’s breadth, durability, ferociousness, and severity. Parts of the 
picture, which is still evolving, defy quantification but, as matters stand, a 
vast number of cadres—mostly flies, yet in a historically unprecedented 
fashion, also some tigers—have been targeted and harshly dealt with,469 at 




The prevailing view is that, at the turn of the second decade of the 21st 
century, pernicious forms of graft pervaded virtually every layer of Chinese 
society.471 The analytically inspired portrayals reflecting this reading of the 
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situation472 are consistent with collective action-style accounts of the 
etiology and dynamics of corruption.473 Such explanatory schemes 
emphasize that, when graft is endemic, no one, even those imbued with a 
transcendent sense of virtue, can escape its clutches because the costs of 
engaging in principled behavior (e.g., financial impairment, loss of 
employment, ostracism, physical harm, ridicule, retribution, and 
stigmatization) significantly outweigh the benefits.474 
An inference has thus been drawn that the CCP, presiding over this 
sordid state of affairs and deeply embroiled in the cauldron of corruption, its 
apparent role in dramatically and persistently lifting living standards over 
three decades notwithstanding, was confronting a serious crisis of 
legitimacy, in all likelihood of the existential variety, as China entered the 
21st century.475 The massive, steadfast, and unflagging post-2012 antigraft 
drive has been depicted as a commensurate response to this enormous 
challenge476 and Xi Jinping, its ingenious and venerable architect, as the 
party’s and the country’s savior.477 The image and its forceful projection 
have enabled Xi to amass official power on a scale unseen during the reform 
era.478  
This construction, however, has not been universally embraced.479 
Notably, some scholars have argued and demonstrated that the CCP has been 
able to maintain and, in fact, strengthen its legitimacy in the face of mounting 
evidence of corruption, perhaps due to the presence of countervailing 
influences.480 Without minimizing the economic and sociopolitical costs of 
graft, and refraining from hypothesizing about its long-term repercussions, 
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chinas-communist-party-thinks-a-corruption-crisis-is-its-biggest-threat-to-power-2015-9.  
 477. See Rowan Callick, Communist Party Acclaims Xi Jinping as China’s Saviour, 
AUSTRALIAN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/communist-par 
ty-acclaims-xi-jinping-as-chinas-saviour/news-story/157bec57c51ff351485e7.  
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Crackdown, NBC (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2014-year-in-review/a 
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they have claimed and shown that the causal relationship between this 
variable and CCP standing has been surprisingly tenuous.481 Rather than a 
threat to the regime, let alone an existential one, corruption has been 
opportunistically manipulated in the context of an unfolding political 
narrative.482 
Another empirically supported contrarian assertion put forward by 
researchers questioning the mainstream Xi-era antigraft picture pertains to 
the efforts of his predecessors.483 The specific contention here is that they 
had not necessarily and recklessly turned a blind eye to corruption.484 Indeed, 
some institutionally meaningful progress had been made in the shape of 
antigraft regulation and enforcement, competition-promoting economic 
deregulation, fiscal consolidation, more effective monitoring of local 
government activities, a move toward a merit-based civil service, and 
revamping of nontransparent and unwieldy budgeting and auditing 
procedures.485 The overall level of corruption may have not declined, but its 
structure may have fundamentally shifted from internal administrative 
processes (embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds) to 
bribery.486 
Given this backdrop, there has been a tendency to assess the current 
antigraft campaign in terms of its motives: an expression of a genuine policy 
concern about corruption and its corrosive socioeconomic impacts, an 
eagerness to safeguard parochial party interests (including its legitimacy), or 
a self-serving desire to solidify Xi Jinping’s power base by providing him 
with a blunt instrument to marginalize his rivals.487 The evidence generated 
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in this respect is somewhat mixed in that the data lend tentative support for 
all three dispositional alternatives.488 The possibility of the entire set being 
relevant cannot be ruled out, with the balance difficult to quantify and 
potentially shifting according to circumstances. 
This has prompted some observers to question the effectiveness of the 
ongoing antigraft program.489 Attention has focused on its political and, by 
implication, unavoidably arbitrary and selective nature (intensity, large 
scale, and perseverance do not ineluctably translate into consistency, 
orderliness, and universal application).490 It is believed that this has 
undermined the credibility, legitimacy, and robustness of the multiyear 
onslaught on corruption, detracting from its usefulness and potentially 
reducing the likelihood of an ultimately successful outcome.491 The fact that 
China’s anticorruption credentials, as gauged by the Transparency 
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(ICESL’14) May 14-15, 2014, Singapore, https://icehm.org/upload/5611ED0514027.pdf. 
 490. See generally Sun & Yuan, supra note 489; Wu, supra note 489; Osburg, supra note 
489; Hough, supra note 489; Mai, supra note 489; Youzhou, supra note 489; Yuen, supra 
note 443; Zhang, supra note 443.  
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International indices, have barely budged during this long period has been 
invoked in support of such a critical appraisal.492 
The picture painted and the underlying reasoning are both valid, but 
partially so and the mapping exercise overlooks some crucial elements, 
negative as well as positive, because of its unidimensional character. For 
instance, mixed-motives, and even self-centered ones, may yield some 
societal benefits, whether intended or unintended. To illustrate, there is 
empirical evidence to suggest that provinces previously headed by 
prosecuted tigers, possibly targeted by Xi Jinping for personal reasons, have 
intensified their antigraft efforts, either due to a politically favorable change 
of leadership or in order to fend off further pressures from Beijing, or a 
combination of the two factors.493 This, in turn, appears to have contributed 
to the decline in corrupt practices, at least during the period covered by the 
study.494 Such seemingly unexpected patterns may be unearthed when socio-
legal phenomena are examined from a multidimensional perspective and in 
a manner acknowledging their inherent complexity. LE offers a practical and 
viable pathway, albeit without providing a fully integrated and wholly 
interdisciplinary analytical framework. 
On the positive side, it is evident that the disincentives against 
succumbing to corruption have increased exponentially. The data speak for 
themselves.495 The figures may well be partly inflated due to the selectively 
political nature of the antigraft campaign, but no suggestions have been made 
that the possible distortion is sufficiently significant to materially detract 
from the representativeness of the picture painted. There can be little doubt 
that the probability of being caught has risen substantially because of the 
high priority accorded to combating corrupt activities, vast resources 
allocated to the mission, and its generally ruthless implementation. Clearly, 
the targeting of tigers and the heavy punishment meted out to them has also 
enhanced deterrence, even though this may be the most politically salient 
component of the program.496 
As indicated, it is not merely a matter of a greater probability of being 
caught. The importance of the increased severity of punishment should not 
 
 492. See Hough supra note 489. 
 493. See Gao, supra note 469. 
 494. See id. 
 495. See Leng & Wertime, supra note 469; Yuen, supra note 443. 
 496. See generally Quah, supra note 463; Fabre, supra note 50; Sun & Yuen, supra note 
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be overlooked either.497 It is true that China has long had strong antigraft 
laws, as attested by the relevant provisions of Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, which came into effect in 1980, and their modernization 
and rejuvenation, undertaken in 1997.498 This legal façade has been markedly 
revitalized, however, since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power.499 Perhaps more 
significantly, enforcement has been dramatically boosted,500 inevitably 
magnifying the deterrent effect of the higher probability of being caught and 
heavier legal sanctions.501 
By the same token, a sense of fear and suspicion has pervaded the fabric 
of post-2012 Chinese society.502 This may be attributable to the authoritarian 
oppression that has characterized Xi’s rule.503 The battle stridently and 
unremittingly waged against corrupt practices has been a central element of 
this equation.504 As pointed out earlier, whatever the broad ramifications of 
the climate of mistrust that has abruptly emerged and rapidly spread, 
exploiting interpersonal fear and suspicion in the war against graft is 
consistent with the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of 
behaviorally inclined LE scholars. It may be a tactic that is particularly 
suitable for social conditions such as those prevailing in China, where 
corrupt activities have traditionally been channeled through close-knit and 
resilient interpersonal networks.505 
LE researchers have written sparingly about the internal organization of 
anticorruption agencies (ACAs). The issue of the relative merits of 
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centralized and decentralized structures remains largely unresolved.506 It 
appears that the balance of advantages and disadvantages depends of a host 
of situational factors.507 In the particular Chinese context, the organizational 
consolidation underway, leading to the creation of a super ACA, the NSC, 
may legitimately be regarded as a step forward, if looked at strictly in terms 
of operational efficiency, simply because it paves the way for better 
coordination and resource utilization.508 Indeed, it may be seen as a reflection 
of a wider trend, even if not yet fulfilled, to revamp regulatory bodies with a 
view to minimizing bureaucratic inefficiencies and overlapping 
responsibilities.509 
On the negative side, civil service reforms have resulted in some 
improvements on the pay front but not of the magnitude to meaningfully 
diminish the appeal of alternative sources of income (other than those of the 
legitimate non-wage variety).510 The total package, including fringe benefits 
and subsidies, notably those related to housing, is considerably more 
attractive511 yet, both in absolute and relative terms, not to the extent of 
materially blunting the incentive to seek avenues for generating 
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supplementary income.512 Interestingly, executives at China’s notoriously 
inefficient, but susceptible to graft, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
experienced no pay rises.513 As pointed out previously, economic reforms 
geared toward injecting dynamism into the system and boosting income 
growth across the workforce have been conspicuous by their absence in the 
Xi Jinping era. 
Additionally, the present anticorruption drive is seriously beset by 
intractable principal-agent problems. The constant invocation of the lofty 
ideal expressed in the notion of the “people” (e.g., equating the regime with 
the “People’s Republic”) notwithstanding, it is obvious that today, more than 
at any other juncture in past four decades, the CCP considers itself as the 
principal in the Chinese body politic and operates as such. The “core 
leadership” and the elaborate organizational apparatus upon which it relies 
on are, for all intents and purposes, unaccountable to any other institutional 
entity. Nothing illustrates this better than the overwhelming support (2958 
National People’s Congress/NPC members in favor, two dissenters, sixteen 
absentees, and one invalid ballot) for the momentous constitutional change 
entailing the removal of term limits to enable Xi Jinping to serve as president 
beyond 2023 (practically indefinitely).514 
There is thus sufficient evidence to indicate that, while not devoid of 
“public interest” elements, and not lacking some unintended positive 
consequences, the antigraft campaign has been mostly inspired by a mixture 
of offensive and defensive elite-level goals, of the personal as well as 
collective type.515 The selective nature of the tiger pursuit lends credence to 
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this argument.516 Indeed, it could be reasonably asserted that the regime’s 
top priority should be unhealthy and destabilizing manifestations of 
unbalanced growth and socioeconomic disparities, coupled with a quest for 
a new developmental model, rather than the eradication of corrupt activities, 
with the latter program configured accordingly.517 
The personal-cum-political dimension of the antigraft drive has 
ineluctably limited its scope and, by extension, operational efficiency. This 
fundamental deficiency has been compounded by what LE scholars portray 
as “adverse selection”518 and “moral hazard.”519 The former pattern has 
materialized when privileged agents have gained access to scarce resources 
by virtue of their connections rather than capabilities (i.e., have been 
“adversely selected”).520 The latter situation has occurred when the 
advantages/safety guarantees explicitly or implicitly granted to such agents 
have led to excessive risk-taking (i.e., morally induced hazardous 
circumstances), perpetuating corrupt behavior in the process; a carefully 
dissected pre-2012 example, which remains relevant, is China’s insurance 
industry heavily dependent on informal networks of power brokers within 
the CCP organizational pyramid and plagued by issues of dubious agent 
credibility.521 
The politicization of the antigraft campaign has diminished its 
efficacy.522 This may be demonstrated by examining the impact of this 
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gigantic endeavor at the leadership, elite, and grassroots levels.523 The 
picture that emerges shows that the gains progressively shrink as the focus 
shifts to lower layers of the social structure.524 The same pattern is observed 
when the question of legitimacy is addressed.525 Since legitimacy or lack 
thereof may impinge on the ultimate success or failure of policy,526 the 
limited acknowledgement of the virtues of the program by ordinary people 
and the perception that it has not tangibly enhanced the quality of their daily 
lives may reasonably give rise to concerns about its long-term viability. 
The challenge is compounded by the fact that the normative and ethical 
side of corruption prevention has been accorded little systematic attention, 
other than at the rhetorical and ideological level, despite a rich historical 
experience of dealing with the issue from that specific angle.527 This has been 
carefully documented with reference to the current antigraft drive.528 
Needless to say, political education in the Xi Jinping era has intensified 
rather than slackened.529 It has largely been confined, however, to ideological 
indoctrination and thought control.530 Doubts have been expressed about the 
enduring effect of such schemes, which often deepen the sense of alienation 
and cynicism among those targeted.531 
Perhaps the most egregious disregard for the tenets derived from the 
principal-agent model—for all intents and purposes, turning it upside-
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down—is seen in the enormous power vested in the NSC in an institutional 
setting devoid of any genuine checks-and-balances. As noted previously, 
such a structural constellation opens the way for a flagrant abuse of power. 
In this context, it should be additionally pointed out that this Leninist-style 
system may well contain the seeds of its own destruction because of the risks 
inherent in having unconstrained agents masquerading as principals.532 The 
situation is reminiscent of that which prevailed during the Ming dynasty.533 
The then corruption inspectors enjoyed great powers without being subject 
to any meaningful supervision, other than the ethereal imperatives of 
Confucian morality.534 Unsurprisingly, they quickly became heavily 
embroiled in corruption themselves.535 
As highlighted earlier, there is no firm consensus among LE researchers 
about the direction of the relationship between graft and economic 
performance, although the distribution of opinion is skewed toward the 
negative side. One of the difficulties in this respect lies in the fact that the 
role played by intervening/mediating variables is seldom properly taken into 
account. A highly compelling explanation of the dynamism exhibited by 
China’s economy is institutional in nature and revolves around 
decentralization as an intervening/mediating force unleashing latent 
entrepreneurial energy in a bottom-up fashion.536 To the extent that heavy-
handed recentralization strategies in the Xi Jinping era are aimed at stifling 
this force, they may aggravate the country’s economic predicament. It would 
be logical to assume that the battle against corruption, which has adverse 
implications for the performance of the national economy and its component 
parts at the best of times, might conceivably be put on the back burner in 







 532. See generally Gang, supra note 508. See also Minxin Pei, Without an Independent 
Judiciary China Cannot Win Its War on Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-war-on-corruption-judiciary_us_589b5cf0e4b0 
4061313adfeb; Jeremy Rhee, The Art of Discipline: The Unintended Consequences of Xi’s 
Antigraft Campaign, BROWN POLITICAL REVIEW (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.brownpolitical 
review.org/2017/03/art-discipline-unintended-consequences-xis-antigraft-campaign/.  
 533. See Anderlini, supra note 400. 
 534. See id. 
 535. See id.  
 536. See Xu, supra note 17. 
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Chinese manifestations of graft are not a unique phenomenon and, as 
evidenced by Transparency International indices,537 China is not necessarily 
the most corrupt country in the world. It is undoubtedly burdened with a 
decidedly high incidence of graft, but it actually marginally outranks India 
and Indonesia, the two other heavily populated Asian countries,538 which are 
dealing with the problem in a different and less ironfisted manner.539 The 
special features in these extensively reported circumstances are thus the 
underlying motives, framing of the issue, its presentation, strategy pursued 
in confronting it, and implementation mechanics. 
Understandably, these distinct characteristics have loomed large in 
media, policy, and scholarly discourse. The purposes of the post-2012 
anticorruption drive, conceptualization and communication of the problem it 
seeks to rectify, and the campaign’s nature and evolution have been 
elaborately depicted. The accounts offered have been mostly descriptive, but 
they have not been devoid of normative underpinnings. The latter have 
displayed a binary pattern, with the regime and its sympathizers lavishly 
extolling the merits of the program and liberally minded commentators 
voicing profound concerns about actual and potential abuses of power. 
Assessment has also centered, possibly primarily so, on the uncertain 
motives behind the mammoth scheme. 
Broader forays into evaluative territory have been few and far between. 
They have typically also lacked a firm analytical foundation and have not 
been undertaken within a cogently integrated conceptual framework. The LE 
paradigm applied in this article is neither all-embracing nor a theoretical 
panacea, but it provides an appropriately wide perspective that it is 
coherently ordered. Graft and its origins are best looked at from an economic 
angle, without dogmatically crowding out complementary approaches. As 
demonstrated here—whatever China’s cultural, historical, political, and 
 
 537. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016?gclid=Cj0
KCQjw0dHdBRDEARIsAHjZYYCu5Pio6ef0hUevkcLNbgq.  
 538. See id. 
 539. See Jeffrey Hutton, How this Agency Is Waging War Against Corruption in Indonesia 
and Winning, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 22, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/politics/article/2103395/how-agency-waging-war-against-corruption-indonesia-and-win 
ning; Lina Vyas & Alfred M. Wu, Why India’ Anti-Corruption Drive May Be a Better Model 
for Others than China’s Campaign, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 7, 2018), https:// 
www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2145021/why-indias-anti-corruption-driv 
e-may-be-better-model-others.  
2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 5/1/2020  4:08 PM 
210 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
 
social peculiarities—it is by no means an extreme outlier whose existence 
calls into question the validity of this proposition. 
An LE-inspired analysis possesses the added advantage of showing that 
there two sides to the large-scale, long, and multilevel war waged by Xi 
Jinping and his allies against a host of corrupt practices that have 
mushroomed in post-1978 Chinese society. First, however much one may 
aspire for a softer and potentially more fruitful Indian/Indonesian strategy 
for tackling graft, it ought to be acknowledged that, as matters stand, this is 
an unrealistic yearning and that, by being consistent with Xi’s leadership 
style and overall policy thrust, the anticorruption drive is moving forward in 
a less muddled fashion than might have otherwise been expected. Second, 
the program has produced some benefits in the form of boosted deterrence, 
greater operational efficiency, and structural enhancements, even if at times 
of the unintended variety. 
At the same time, it is apparent that these selective gains have been 
overshadowed by the campaign’s drawbacks and negative repercussions. 
The asymmetries besetting the balance of pecuniary incentives and 
disincentives faced by public sector employees have not been earnestly 
addressed. Above all, the antigraft campaign has been plagued by principal-
agent problems of such magnitude that they may not be amenable to Xi 
Jinping-era-style remedies. Barring a fundamental reorientation across the 
entire policy spectrum, amounting to regime reengineering, the battle against 
corruption may have to be carried on indefinitely, consuming vast resources 
and extinguishing economic vitality in the process, without making far-
reaching headway on the antigraft front and without substantially bolstering 
CCP legitimacy. 
China has experienced recurring cycles of centralization and 
decentralization in both the revolutionary and reform eras.540 They have 
typically entailed administrative tightening and relaxation, with the 
government shunning away from genuine marketization of the economy.541 
The costs have been enormous and limited long-lasting benefits have been 
generated while pressing on in either direction.542 The current centralization 
phase may have been implemented more tenaciously than its predecessors 
 
 540. See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 
35-83 (2d ed. 2015); Justin Y. Lin, Ran Tao, & Mingxing Liu, Decentralization, Deregulation 
and Economic Transition in China in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 466-490 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013), 
available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/decentralisation/china.pdf.   
 541. See Wu, supra note 540; Lin, Tao, & Liu, supra note 540. 
 542. See Wu, supra note 540; Lin, Tao, & Liu, supra note 540. 
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and may sustain its momentum for some time, but there is no reason to 
believe that the results will be materially different than in the past. Indeed, 
undisciplined pursuit of the Chinese dream may culminate in “imperial 
overreach,”543 unleashing disruptive forces whose impact may be difficult to 
predict. The ultimate fate of the ongoing anticorruption drive hinges on how 
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